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Fundamentally Unfair: Databases, Deportation, and the Crimmigrant Gang
Member
Abstract
Provocative language painting immigrants as dangerous criminals and promises of increased
immigration enforcement were cornerstones of Donald j Trump's presidential candidacy. As president, he
has maintained this rhetoric and made good on many of his promises by broadening the definition of
"criminal conduct" for immigration enforcement purposes, touting a renewed focus on immigrant gangs
and cartels, and conducting several nation-wide anti-gang sweeps that placed an estimated 1095 "known"
gang members in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody. But the Trump Administration
did not create the specter of the criminal immigrant, or "crimmigrant," gang member, nor did it create the
detection and removal infrastructure, preloaded with thousands of "gang members." Rather, the Trump
Administration inherited the crimmigrant gang-member pipeline from the Obama Administration.
To target noncitizen gang members, the Obama Administration utilized data sharing agreements between
the Department of Homeland Security and state and local law enforcement to create immigration priority
lists from state gang membership databases. Under these agreements, ICE is authorized to search nearly
a thousand databases for removable non citizens. The entries in these databases, however, present
significant due process and data accuracy concerns, especially when this data flows unimpeded and
uncorroborated from local law enforcement into civil immigration proceedings.
The Fifth Amendment protects noncitizens in civil removal proceedings and affords them the right to a
full and fair hearing, along with a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their own behalf and
examine the evidence against them. The use of unsubstantiated gang data in removal proceedings
violates these rights, making the hearing fundamentally unfair. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test to
the use of unsubstantiated gang data in removal proceedings, the current procedures violate a
noncitizen's due process rights and increase the risk that otherwise eligible immigrants will be
erroneously denied the chance to meaningfully apply for relief and then removed from the country. To
comport with the fundamental fairness evidence standard and ensure noncitizens accused of gang
membership receive a full and fair hearing, unsubstantiated gang data must either be excluded from
removal proceedings, shared with the individual in advance, or corroborated before it is shared with the
individual and admitted into evidence in immigration proceedings.
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Provocative language painting immigrants as dangerous criminals and
promises of increased immigration enforcement were cornerstones of Donaldj
Trump's presidentialcandidacy. As president, he has maintainedthis rhetoric
and made good on many of his promises by broadening the definition of
"criminal conduct" for immigration enforcement purposes, touting a renewed
focus on immigrant gangs and cartels, and conducting several nation-wide
anti-gang sweeps that placed an estimated 1095 "known" gang members in
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody. But the Trump
Administration did not create the specter of the criminal immigrant, or
"crimmigrant," gang member, nor did it create the detection and removal
infrastructure, preloaded with thousands of "gang members." Rather, the
Trump Administration inherited the crimmigrant gang-member pipeline from
the Obama Administration.
To target noncitizen gang members, the ObamaAdministration utilized datasharingagreementsbetween the Department ofHomeland Security and state and
local law enforcement to create immigration priority lists from state gang
membership databases. Under these agreements, ICE is authorized to search
nearly a thousand databasesfor removable noncitizens. The entries in these
databases,however, present significantdue process and data accuracy concerns,
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especially when this dataflows unimpeded and uncorroboratedfrom local law
enforcement into civil immigrationproceedings.
The Fifth Amendment protects noncitizens in civil removal proceedings and
affords them the right to a full and fair hearing, along with a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence on their own behalf and examine the evidence
against them. The use of unsubstantiatedgang data in removal proceedings
violates these rights, making the hearingfundamentally unfair. Applying the
Mathews v. Eldridge test to the use of unsubstantiatedgang data in removal
proceedings, the currentproceduresviolate a noncitizen's due process rights and
increase the risk that otherwise eligible immigrantswill be erroneously denied the
chance to meaningfully apply for reliefand then removed from the country. To
comport with the fundamental fairness evidence standard and ensure
noncitizens accused of gang membership receive a full and fair hearing,
unsubstantiatedgang data must either be excluded from removal proceedings,
shared with the individual in advance, or corroboratedbefore it is shared with
the individualand admitted into evidence in immigrationproceedings.
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INTRODUCTION

"That's why, over the past six years, deportationsof criminals are up
[eighty] percent. And that's why we're going to keep focusing
enforcement resources on actual threats to our security. Felons, not
families. Criminals, not children. Gang members, not a mom who's
working hard to providefor her kids. We'll prioritize,just like law
enforcement does every day."
-President Barack Obama, November 20, 20141

1. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration, 2014 DAiLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 2 (Nov. 20, 2014).
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"As I have said repeatedly to the country, we are going to get the bad
ones out-the criminals and the drug dealers and ... gang members

and cartel leaders."
-President

DonaldJ. Trump, January 25, 20172

Only days into his presidency, President Trump issued Executive
Order 13,768, increasing resources for immigration enforcement,
broadening the definition of "criminal conduct" for immigration
enforcement purposes, and expanding the discretion of immigration
officers to target individual noncitizens.' Combined, these provisions
allow immigration authorities to target anyone they believe to have
broken any law, regardless of whether the individual was ever charged
with the crime.4 In the weeks following the Executive Order, the
Trump Administration conducted several high-profile immigration
raids and even detained DACA recipients, a group of young adults
brought to the country as children, whom the Obama Administration
had formerly shielded from deportation.6 These actions inflamed the
2. Julian Aguilar, In Addition to Border Wall, Trump's Executive Action Targets
Detention Space, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 25, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2017/01/25/trump-announces-executive-actions-immigration (reporting on remarks
made by President DonaldJ. Trump at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)).
3. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No.
13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017);Jennifer Medina, Trump's Immigration Order
Expands the Definition of 'Criminal,'N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/01/26/us/trump-immigration-deportation.html.
4. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8,800 (outlining new enforcement
priorities and practices for interior immigration enforcement, including prioritizing any
noncitizen who has "committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal offense" or poses
a risk to public safety or national security "in the judgment of an immigration officer").
5. In 2012, the Obama Administration announced the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals Program, also known as DACA. See Catherine E. Shoichet et al.,
US Immigration: DACA and Dreamers Explained, CNN http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/
04/politics/daca-dreamers-immigration-program/index.html (last updated Oct. 11,
2017, 2:19 PM). Under the DACA program, young adults without immigration status
who were brought to the country as children could apply to the government for a twoyear deferral of deportation. Id. In addition to authorization to legally reside in the
United States, DACA recipients were eligible for work permits, driver's licenses,
enrollment in colleges and universities, and income taxes. Id. DACA status, however,
did not create a pathway to permanent residency or citizenship and was always
vulnerable to a change in policy. Id. In September 2017, President Trump announced
that his administration will end the DACA program, but he has urged Congress to pass
a legislative solution for DACA recipients. Id.
6. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., Immigr. & Customs Enf't, Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014),
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passion of immigration hardliners, raised the ire of immigration
advocates, and struck fear throughout immigrant communities. Yet
these enforcement priorities are not so different: 7 despite the
divergent rhetoric from President Obama's tenure in office, President
Trump's enforcement priorities for certain noncitizens are simply the
same policies with a new spokesperson. Specifically for "crimmigrant"9
gang members, the Trump Administration has inherited the Obama
Administration's detection and deportation infrastructure, preloaded
with thousands of "gang members" ready for removal. 10
While the Obama Administration shielded groups of sympathetic
noncitizens from deportation through high-profile uses of
prosecutorial discretion, it simultaneously increased enforcement
against other noncitizens." Beginning in 2011, the Department of
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14 1120_memo-prosecutorial
_discretion.pdf [hereinafter Enforcement PriorityMemo 2014]; Memorandum from John
Morton, Dir., Immigr. & Customs Enft, to All Employees, Secretary Napolitano's
Memorandum Concerning the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion for Certain Removable
Individuals Who Entered the United States as a Child (june 15, 2012),
https: //www.ice.gov /doclib /about/ offices/ ero/pdf /sl-certain-young-peoplemorton.pdf [hereinafter Enforcement PriorityMemo 2012] (directing Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents to use prosecutorial discretion when prioritizing
deportations and exempting enforcement against certain childhood arrivals).
7. Amy Taxin & Alicia A. Caldwell, Fact Check: Are Immigration Raids Result of
Donald Trump's
Policy?, DENV.
POST
(Feb.
13,
2017,
12:05
PM),
http: //www.denverpost.com/2017 /02/13 /immigration-raids-fact-check.
8. Ali Winston, Obama's Use of Unreliable Gang Databasesfor Deportations Could Be a
Model for Trump, INTERCEPT (Nov. 28, 2016, 12:24 PM), https://theintercept.com/
2016/11/28/obamas-use-of-unreliable-gang-databases-for-deportations-could-be-amodel-for-trump.
9. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006) (defining "crimmigration law" as the merger
of criminal and immigration law in both substance and procedure, with immigration
law taking on "many attributes" of criminal law); see also C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia
Hernandez, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457, 1458-59 (2013) (noting
that the creation of criminal penalties for immigration violations, the adoption of
criminal law enforcement practices into immigration enforcement, and the intertwinement
of crime control and migration control are the "emblems" of crimmigration law).
10. See Winston, supra note 8 (describing the bipartisan consensus that created the
existing gang information sharing and deportation infrastructure).
11. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., Immigr. & Customs Enft, to All
Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, Exercising
ProsecutorialDiscretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the
Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretionmemo.pdf [hereinafter ProsecutorialDiscretion Memo 2011]; Enforcement Priority Memo
2014, supra note 6; Enforcement PriorityMemo 2012, supra note 6.
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Homeland Security (DHS) outlined positive factors for Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel to consider when
determining whether a certain noncitizen merited a favorable use of
prosecutorial discretion.12 Conversely, "known gang members or other
individuals who pose a clear danger to public safety" were flagged for
"particular care and consideration by ICE officers" as priorities for
deportation." DHS did not define what conduct or convictions made
a gang member "known," but a pattern emerged in subsequent years.
The Obama Administration created immigration priority lists using
state gang membership databases and criminal enforcement priority
lists-information available because of DHS's data-sharing agreements
with state and local law enforcement agencies. Since 2011, ICE has
been authorized to search nearly one thousand local and state law
enforcement databases for removable noncitizens. 4 The Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) authorizes these cooperative
agreements, which allow federal officers to enter into information
sharing agreements with local and state law enforcement.15 These
information-sharing agreements give DHS access to databases across
the country that record and track individuals-citizens and
noncitizens-whom local police consider to be gang members. "6 Over
time, access to these databases provides DHS with a continuous and
vast pipeline of noncitizen "known gang members" to apprehend and
remove.1 7 However, when gang database entries flow to ICE, important
contextual information is lost, such as the conduct or criteria a specific

12. See ProsecutorialDiscretion Memo 2011, supra note 11 (explaining when DHS
personnel should consider, inter alia, the individual's military service; status as a victim,
witness, or plaintiff in civil or criminal proceedings; and humanitarian factors, such as
poor health, age, pregnancy, or a seriously ill relative).
13. See id. (emphasis added) (delineating exercise of prosecutorial discretion
guidelines for ICE officials, and enumerating positive and negative factors for
consideration on a case-by-case basis).
14. George Joseph, Where ICE Already Has Direct Lines to Law-Enforcement Databases
with ImmigrantData, NPR: CODE SWITCH (May 12, 2017, 1:44 PM), http://www.npr.org/
sections/codeswitch/2017/05/12/479070535/where-ice-already-has-direct-lines-tolaw-enforcement-databases-with-immigrant-d.
15. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2012); see also id. § 1357(g) (2012) (stating that the
Attorney General may enter written agreements with state or local governments to
authorize local law enforcement to share some functions of federal immigration officers).
16. See infra Section I.B.2 (discussing federal data-sharing partnerships and Operation
Community Shield); Rebecca A. Hufstader, Note, Immigration Reliance on GangDatabases:

Unchecked Discretion and Undesirable Consequences, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 671, 679 (2015).
17. See infra Section I.B.2 (discussing federal data-sharing partnerships and how
these partnerships inform immigration enforcement against alleged gang members).
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jurisdiction uses to define a gang member, and ICE does not conduct
additional investigations to corroborate the information. 8
By relying on unsubstantiated data to identify immigration targets, the
Obama Administration placed noncitizens accused of gang membership,
regardless of their underlying conduct, at a greater risk of removal
from the country than other noncitizens. Designation as a gang
member makes it more difficult for a noncitizen to access relief under
immigration law, either because gang membership bars them from
receiving certain visas or because individuals who qualify for relief from
deportation bear the burden of convincing an immigration judge that
they merit a discretionary grant of relief.19 In the face of governmentproffered evidence and a presidential administration's enforcement
priorities, 0 very few "gang members" will be able to convince an
administrative agency or immigration judge to grant them relief.
The Obama Administration's bifurcated use of prosecutorial
discretion, which increased enforcement against some while shielding
others, ignored the overlap between sympathetic or "good"
noncitizens and the "bad." This overlap became increasingly clear as
large numbers of Central American refugees began arriving in the
United States. Beginning in 2014, tens of thousands of Central
American refugees fled the gang-dominated countries of Guatemala,

18. See infra Sections I.B.1-2 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of
tracking gang members, populating state gang databases, and sharing information
across federal-state partnerships).
19. See infra Section I.C.1 (outlining the statutory requirements and the role of
discretionary relief in removal proceedings).
20. In spring 2017, ICE conducted its largest raid to date against immigrant gang
members, reporting the arrest of 1095 individuals nationwide. See ICE-Led GangSurge
Nets 1,378 Arrests Nationwide, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (May 11, 2017),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-led-gang-surge-nets-1378-arrests-nationwide
[hereinafter ICE-Led GangSurge].
21. See Ali Winston, Vague Rules Let ICE Deport Undocumented Immigrants as Gang
Members, INTERCEPT (Feb. 17, 2017, 7:12 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/02/17/
loose-classification-rules-give-ice-broad-authority-to-classify-immigrants-as-gangmembers (quoting an immigration attorney's argument that the government should
not use gang database information against noncitizens otherwise eligible for relief
from deportation because a neutral decision maker has not verified the gang
membership allegation through the adversarial process). See generally, Tal Kopan &
LauraJarrett, Trump Keeps DACA but Chips Away at Barriers to Deportation,CNN (Feb. 21,
2017, 3:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/21/politics/daca-dreamers-donaldtrump-both-ways (quoting an immigration attorney's assertion that it is "very difficult
forjudges to look past the [gang] allegation once it's been made").
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Honduras, and El Salvador.2 2 Staggering levels of violence, rampant
impunity for perpetrators, and pervasive corruption have made the
"Northern Triangle" one of the most dangerous regions in the world.23
Because gangs target youths, the majority of the arriving refugees were
24
mothers and their children seeking safety and reuniting with family.
However, because the gangs who terrorize the Northern Triangle also
2
operate in Central American communities in the United States, 1
refugees fleeing gang violence often relocated to U.S. communities
heavily policed by local law enforcement agents using databases to
track gang membership. In 2016, the Obama Administration carried
out several immigration enforcement actions against these recent
arrivals,26 including more than 300 teenagers.2 7 Included within the
immigrants taken into ICE custody were 120 former unaccompanied
alien children-a humanitarian designation under immigration law. 2s
ICE reported that the teenagers were enforcement targets because
they had criminal histories and/or suspected gang ties.29
This Comment argues that unsubstantiated gang membership data
violates the fundamental fairness evidence standard and admitting this
evidence in removal proceedings violates a noncitizen's Fifth

22.

JONATHAN

T. HISKEYETAL.,

AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING THE CENTRAL

AMERICAN REFUGEE CRISIS: WHY THEY ARE FLEEING AND How U.S. POLICIES ARE FAILING

TO DETER THEM 1 (Feb. 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/

default/files/research/understanding-the central american-refugee-crisis.pdf.
23. See Danielle Renwick, Central America's Violent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/centralamericas-violent-northern-triangle/p 3 7 2 8 6 (indicating that the Northern Triangle
includes El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and noting that El Salvador was the
"world's most violent country not at war" in 2015).
24. See HISKEY ET AL., supira note 22, at 1; Kate Linthicum, Why Tens of Thousands of
Kids from El Salvador Continue to Flee to the United States, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017)
http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-el-salvador-refugees20170216-htmlstory.html (reporting that teenagers and children, some as young as
nine, are recruited by gangs).
25. Renwick, supra note 23.
26. Editorial Board, The Dark Side of Immigration Discretion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20,
2016), https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20 /opinion/the-dark-side-of-immigrationdiscretion.html.
27. See id. (noting that ICE targeted the teens for deportation and picked many of
them up on their way to and from high school); ICEAnnouncesResults of OperationBorder
Guardian/Border Resolve, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/
news/releases/ice-announces-results-operation-border-guardianborder-resolve
(last
visited Oct. 23, 2017) [hereinafter ICE Announces Results of Operation].
28. ICEAnnounces Results of Operation,supra note 27.
29. Id.
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Amendment right to a full and fair hearing. Noncitizens in removal
proceedings are entitled to due process of law, 0 including the right to
a full and fair hearing, the "reasonable opportunity" to examine the
evidence against them and proffer evidence, and the exclusion of
fundamentally unfair evidence. 1 While service of a Notice to Appear
("NTA")3 2 puts noncitizens on notice of the immigration violations
charged against them, this service does not include any allegations of
gang membership pulled from a gang database and admitteduncontested and uncorroborated-into removal or bond proceedings
through the Form 1-213 Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien (I213)33 or other sources. To apply for a grant of discretionary relief in
a hearing that is full and fair, an individual must have a genuine
opportunity to present evidence that he possesses good moral
character and deserves to remain in the United States. Without notice
of the discretionary argument against him, the individual cannot
examine the evidence against him, which makes it nearly impossible
for him to meet his burden of proof in his discretionary case before
the immigration judge. The number of noncitizens accused of gang
membership but statutorily eligible for discretionary relief is likely
relatively small;3 4 however, for these individuals, the stakes could not
be higher.
Individuals deported as "gang members" may be
permanently barred from returning to the United States and will likely

30. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (reiterating that immigrants in
removal proceedings are entitled to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment);
Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing the use of hearsay
evidence in removal proceedings as long as the hearsay is "probative and its admission
is fundamentally fair"); Lam, 14 I. & N. Dec. 168, 172 (B.I.A. 1972) (articulating that
removal hearings are administrative proceedings that are civil in nature and "the sole
criteria for documentary evidence lawfully obtained is whether it has probative value
and whether its use is consistent with a fair hearing").
31. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) (4) (B) (2012); Lam, 14 1. & N. Dec. at 170, 172.
32. The NTA is the charging document in immigration court that DHS is
statutorily required to provide to a noncitizen before a removal hearing. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(a) (1); infra Section I.C.4.
33. The 1-213 is generally conceptualized as the police report of removal proceedings.
See infra Section II.C.1 (exploring the differences between the 1-213 and NTA).
34. To be statutorily eligible for discretionary relief, such as asylum, cancelation of
removal, and adjustment of status, an individual must pass residency requirements,
admission or visa procedures, and criminal bars. Even if an individual meets the
statutory requirements for a specific form of relief, the judge may use his discretion to
deny the individual or to determine that the individual lacks good moral character.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b), 1229b(b) (1), 1255(a); see also infra Section 1.C.2.
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be deported to one of the three most violent countries in the world."a
Therefore, to comport with the evidentiary standard of fundamental
fairness and the procedural due process requirement of a fair hearing,
noncitizens who are statutorily eligible for discretionary relief must
receive notice of the gang allegation in advance of their hearing. This
would provide them a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence
against them and provide any countervailing evidence or testimony in
their discretionary case.
Section L.A of this Comment explores the increasing convergence of
criminal and immigration law in statutes, policy, and the public
consciousness, begetting the trope of the crimmigrant gang member.
Section I.B examines how local and state law enforcement gathers and
stores gang membership data and how that information is shared with
DHS. Section I.C outlines the statutory requirements of removal
proceedings, the important role of discretion in immigration court,
the "fundamental fairness" evidentiary standard, and the procedural
due process protections that apply to noncitizens. Part II posits that
the admission of unsubstantiated gang membership data violates the
fundamental fairness evidence standard for immigration court and
applies the Mathezs v. Eldridge"6 test-which determines the minimum
due process procedures required in a civil case 7 -to DHS's use of this
data in removal proceedings.
Finally, Part III proposes several
solutions to address the due process and data reliability issues posed by
the use of unsubstantiated gang database allegations in immigration
court. Solutions include requiring DHS to share gang membership
allegations with an individual in advance of his"8 removal proceeding 9
and requiring further corroboration of the allegation by DHS before
it is admitted as evidence. Additionally, state-level legislation could
mandate that individuals listed in gang databases receive notice, which
necessitates higher standards of data maintenance.

35. Sibylla Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington, US Government Deporting Central American
Migrants to TheirDeaths,GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015, 8:57 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2015/oct/12/obama-immigration-deportations-central-america.
36. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
37. Id. at 335.
38. Because the majority of individuals deported from the United States are male,
this Comment uses the male pronoun to refer to noncitizens broadly and to those with
alleged gang connections.
39. See ICE Deportations: Gender,Age, and Country of Citizenship,TRAC IMMIGR. (Apr.
9, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/350 (reporting that ninety-four
percent of deportees in 2013 were male, according to ICE records).
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FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR
I. BACKGROUND

A. The Rise of the CrimmigrantGang Member
Immigration is a complex and arcane area of the law where many
competing government priorities overlap and often conflict. Rules for
recruiting skilled foreign workers, guidelines governing national
security threat detection and exclusion, family reunification, and
international humanitarian programs are all governed by the nation's
immigration laws. 0 At their core, immigration laws define the types of
noncitizens American society sees as desirable and beneficial and those
that it does not.41 Since the passage of the INA in 1952,42 criminal
convictions and certain criminal activities have either barred
noncitizens from admission to the United States or triggered their
removal.4"
In the late twentieth century, however, Congress
implemented a series of reforms that moved the civil immigration code
much closer to the criminal code in several significant ways. Over the
course of a few decades, changes to the immigration code criminalized
immigration violations that were formerly only civil offenses, increased

40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012) (allotting immigrant visas for familial ties to four
tiers of relatives of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents); § 1153(b) (1) (A)
(providing immigrant visas for aliens with extraordinary ability); § 1101 (a) (15) (H)
(nonimmigrant visas for high-skilled workers); § 1101 (a) (15) (P) (nonimmigrant visas
for professional athletes and entertainers); § 1182 (defining the criteria and conduct
that make a noncitizen inadmissible); § 1227 (defining the conduct that will make a
noncitizen deportable).
41. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY 136 (6th ed. 2015) (noting that "the law by which a nation selects its
members speaks volumes about the nation's values and about the society those values
will produce").
42. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537).
43. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2).
Before 1996, noncitizens in the
process of being removed from the United States faced "deportation" proceedings,
whereas noncitizens who were stopped as they sought to enter the United States faced
"exclusion" proceedings. After 1996, the process by which the government chooses to
remove noncitizens from the country after entry is called "removal" proceedings,
regardless of whether a noncitizen is seeking lawful admission or was already lawfully
admitted. While the term "deportation" is still used by the public to describe removal,
the distinction between individuals in removal but seeking lawful admission and those
in removal after lawful admission remains legally significant. Individuals seeking
admission to the United States must overcome inadmissibility grounds listed in 8
U.S.C. § 1182, but individuals already lawfully admitted to the U.S. must overcome the
deportability grounds listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1227. See RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF
IMMIGRATION LAW 30-31 (Am. Immigr. Law. Ass'n 4th ed. 2016).
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penalties for noncitizens convicted of crimes, and gave statutory
shape
44
crimmigrant.
dangerous
the
of
specter
familiar
now
to the
In the 1980s, in response to increasing numbers of authorized 4' and
unauthorized immigrants, Congress created the expansive category of
deportable offenses known as "aggravated felonies. '46 First defined in
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198847 as part of the nascent "War on
Drugs," aggravated felonies began as a list of drug-related convictions
that would result in deportation for noncitizens, absent an
immigration judge's grant of discretionary relief.4 Since 1988, the list
of aggravated felonies has expanded to cover many offenses, leading
one immigration nonprofit to posit that it includes whatever offenses
"Congress sees fit to label as such, and today includes many nonviolent
and seemingly minor offenses. '49 Once a crime is defined as an
aggravated felony, immigration consequences apply retroactively,
meaning that any lawfully present noncitizen previously convicted of
the enumerated crime immediately becomes deportable.o
In 1996, Congress passed two immigration reform measures known
collectively as the "1996 Amendments," which further expanded the

44. SeeJennifer M. Chac6n, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the
"Criminal Street Gang Member," 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 321 (2007) (exploring the
mechanics of the federal Community Shield program and how federal immigration
officials share and use local gang data); Garcia Hernandez, supra note 9, at 1460-61
(charting the social, political, and legal changes that led to the melding of criminal
and immigration law into crimmigration law).
45. In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which,
among other changes to the immigration system, awarded green cards to an estimated
2.7 million previously undocumented immigrants. See Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1324a); Emily Badger, What Happened to the Millions of Immigrants GrantedLegal
Status Under Ronald Reagan?, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (Nov. 26, 2014),
https: //www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp /2014/11/ 26 /what-happened-tothe-millions-of-immigrants-granted-legal-status-under-ronald-reagan.
46. See Chac6n, supra note 44, at 321 (remarking that "Congress revised immigration
laws to respond to the growing national preoccupation with drug crimes").
47. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469 (1988)
(current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1521-1548).
48. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7342; see also Chac6n, supra note 44, at 321-22.
49. AGGRAVATED FELONIES: AN OVERVIEW, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1 (Dec. 2016),
https:/ /www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/aggravat
ed felonies.pdf (defining aggravated felony "as a term of art used to describe a
category of offenses carrying particularly harsh immigration consequences for
noncitizens convicted of such crimes").
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (iii) (mandating that "[a]ny alien who is convicted of
an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable").
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list of aggravated felonies while simultaneously restricting eligibility for
all forms of removal relief."l One amendment added many crimes
traditionally associated with American gangs to the aggravated felony
list, including, but not limited to, counterfeiting, bribing a witness, and
conducting an illegal gambling business. 2 The amendment also
barred naturalization for anyone convicted of an aggravated felony
after November 29, 1990."3 The 1996 Amendments criminalized a
removed individual's unlawful re-entry to the United States, replacing
the civil penalty with criminal sentences ranging from ten to twenty
years, depending on the original grounds of removal. 4 Perhaps most
notably, the 1996 Amendments eliminated the most common form of
relief from removal, known as the § 212(c) waiver," 5 which had allowed
immigration judges to grant discretionary relief after weighing an
individual's positive or compelling qualities against his criminal and
immigration record. 6 Prior to 1996, individuals with aggravated felony
convictions had often received relief under this provision, but after
1996, individuals convicted of aggravated felonies were statutorily
7
prohibited from receiving most forms of discretionary relief.1
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) further
contributed to the confluence of criminal and immigration
enforcement when it created the Violent Gang Task Force to combat
dangerous street gangs in 1992. By 1997, the task force had worked
with police departments in sixteen U.S. cities, collaborating with local
police by sharing data and using federal immigration law to augment
local anti-gang efforts.s Following the terrorist attacks on September
51. The 1996 Amendments include the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA). SeeAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2256); Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
52. See8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
53. Id.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (imposing sentences of between ten and twenty years for
illegal re-entry and re-entry after the commission of a felony and subsequent
deportation).
55. See8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).
56. See Chac6n, supra note 44, at 322 n.16 (noting that while it was available, relief
from deportation under INA § 212(c) was granted in about half of all deportation
proceedings).
57. Id. at 322 n.16, 323; see infra Section I.C.2 (discussing the role of discretion in
removal proceedings).
58. See Chac6n, supra note 44, at 325.
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11, 2001, and the subsequent reorganization of the INS into DHS,
collaborative enforcement efforts between local law enforcement and
federal immigration officials increased. 9 Efforts to improve national
security in the wake of the attacks dovetailed with a national
conversation conflating immigrant communities and crime, leading to
the proliferation of programs using "immigration regulations as a
means of bolstering domestic crime control efforts."60
Recent legislative and administrative reforms to the immigration
system have likewise devoted significant resources to detecting and
deporting "criminal aliens," especially those involved in gangs.61
Federal deportation data does not specify which crimes deportees have
committed, and the crimes triggering deportation can vary widely
according to congressional and presidential priorities.62 For example,
under the Obama Administration, individuals suspected of
committing acts of terrorism and individuals who entered the country
without documents after 2014 were both listed under the highest
enforcement priority.6" As discussed above, the Obama Administration
also initiated Operation Border Guardian, targeting recently arrived
Central American immigrants and focusing on teenagers with criminal
histories or suspected gang ties.64 The Trump Administration continued
this enforcement trend in spring 2017, reporting 1095 arrests as a

59. Id. at 326-27.
60. Id. at 327; see infra Section I.B (discussing federal and local information sharing
programs that facilitate the use of locally collected law enforcement data in
immigration proceedings).
61. See generally Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration
Modernization Act, S. Res. 744, 113th Cong. § 3701(c)(1)(B) (2013). In June 2013,
the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, a
comprehensive immigration reform bill, passed the Senate. Id. While the bill never
became law, the process demonstrated that the price of modestly pro-immigrant
reforms would be harsher penalties for immigrants convicted of crimes, specifically
crimmigrant gang members. Id. For example, while the bill proposed a path to
citizenship, any individual DHS designated as a gang member would have been barred
from applying. Id.
62. Teresa Wiltz, What CrimesAre EligibleforDeportation?,PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Dec.
21, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/12/
21/what-crimes-are-eligible-for-deportation
(noting that deportable crimes in
immigration law often change in accordance with congressional will, do not require a
conviction, and apply retroactively).
63. Enforcement PriorityMemo 2014, supra note 6, at 3.
64. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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result of a six-week, nation-wide gang sweep.6" Ajuly ICE raid focused
specifically on teen gang members, leading to 650 arrests even though
only 130 of the teenagers arrested had criminal convictions.6 6
B. Gang Lists and Databases: Defining and Tracking Gang Members
The INA does not include any mention of the word gang, nor does
it impose specific immigration consequences for street gang
membership or association. 7 Despite legislative proposals to amend
the INA to define and include gang membership as grounds for
removal, none have been enacted to date,6" leading federal
immigration authorities to rely on partnerships with local law
enforcement where gang enforcement priorities align.6 9 Federal
immigration authorities do not have the resources to remove every
individual in violation of immigration law, which leads each president
to issue enforcement priorities that distinguish targets among those
eligible for removal. 70 During the Obama Administration and now
65. See ICE-Led Gang Surge, supra note 20 (reporting the sweep as the latest
successful Operation Community Shield operation between federal and local law
enforcement and stating that 1095 of the individuals arrested were confirmed as gang
members and affiliates).
66. See Christie Thompson, How ICE Uses Secret Police Databasesto Arrest Immigrants,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 28, 2017, 7:00 AM) https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2017/08/28/how-ice-uses-secret-police-databases-to-arrest-immigrants#.c9orEGMWg.
Following these raids the American Civil Liberties Union filed a class action suit against
the government on behalf of the proposed class of unaccompanied immigrant teens
held in jail-like conditions without sufficient evidence that they were affiliated with
gangs. Nicole Narea, Immigrant Teens Unjustly Jailed as Gang Members: ACLU, LAW360
(Aug. 14, 2017, 3:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/953705.
67. Chac6n, supra note 44, at 330.
68. On September 14, 2017, the Criminal Alien Gang Member Removal Act passed
the House of Representatives. If enacted, the bill would amend the INA to make
immigrants associated with a criminal gang inadmissible, deportable, and ineligible
for various forms of relief. H.R. 3697, 115th Cong. § 2(a)-(g) (2017).
69. See, e.g., ProsecutorialDiscretion Memo 2011, supra note 11 (prioritizing the
detection and deportation of "known gang members"); Memorandum from Jeff
Sessions, Att'y Gen. of the United States, to All Fed. Prosecutors, Renewed Commitment
to Criminal Immigration Enforcement (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/press-release/file/956841 /download (instructing all federal prosecutors to
prioritize the detection and prosecution of noncitizens present in the United States
with certain immigration and criminal violations, such as "one or more prior
misdemeanor improper entry convictions with aggravating circumstances," one of
which is "gang membership or affiliation").
70. Lazaro Zamora, ComparingTrump and Obama'sDeportationPriorities,BIPARTISAN
POL'YCTR. (Feb. 27, 2017), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/comparing-trump-andobamas-deportation-priorities.
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under the Trump Administration, gang members are high priority
targets. 71 State and local law enforcement maintain gang databases to
assist their criminal cases but sign information sharing agreements that
allow ICE to access this data for removal purposes. 72 With access to
these databases, ICE can search for noncitizens in violation of
immigration law and then initiate removal proceedings against them.73
ICE has this authority even if local law enforcement never charged or
arrested the individual and this unchecked flow of information from a
local criminal to a federal civil database raises concerns about
74
individual notice and data accuracy.

1. State gang databases
State statutes that define "gang member" and classify levels of gang
participation generally follow a criterion-based format. From state to
state, the criminalized conduct covers a broad spectrum of activity and
behavior and the numbers required to constitute a gang range anywhere
from one to five people.7 Statutory criteria indicate an individual's
level of involvement in the gang, and the greater the number of criteria
an individual satisfies, the greater his involvement in the gang. 76 In
Arizona, for example, an individual must meet two of seven criteria

71. See Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order
No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017); Enforcement Priority Memo 2014, supra
note 6; Enforcement PriorityMemo 2012, supra note 6; ProsecutorialDiscretion Memo 2011,
supra note 11.
72. See Thompson, supra note 66.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-105 (2016) (defining a criminal street gang
as an association with "at least one individual who is a known criminal street gang
member," in which "members or associates individually or collectively engage in the
commission, attempted commission, facilitation, or solicitation of any felony act");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 616 (2015) (defining a criminal street gang as a group of
three or more persons having as one of its primary activities the commission of,
conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of a violent crime, such as murder, kidnapping,
assault, or sexual offenses); S.C. CODEANN. § 16-8-230 (2013) (defining a criminal gang
as a group of five or more persons "who form for the purpose of committing criminal
activity and who knowingly and actively participate in a pattern of criminal gang activity").
76. See NAT'L GANG CTR., BRIEF REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE DEFINITIONS OF THE
TERMS
"GANG,"
"GANG
CRIME,"
AND
"GANG
MEMBER"
3
(Dec. 2016),
https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/content/documents/definitions.pdf
(providing an overview of federal and state gang legislation and statutory definitions);
What Is a Gang? Definitions, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. (Oct. 28, 2011), https://nij.gov/
topics/crime/gangs/pages/definitions.aspx (defining an affiliate as an individual
"loosely affiliated" with a gang) [hereinafter What Is a Gang?].
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before state law enforcement considers him a gang member, with
criteria ranging from "witness testimony or official statement" to "any
other indicia of street gang membership." 77 In Florida, an individual
who hits a single criterion enumerated in the statute-such as having
a tattoo affiliated with a criminal gang-is a gang "associate. '"78
With statutory criteria as the guide, local law enforcement agencies
generally employ two ways of engaging with suspected gang members:
targeted investigations and field interviews. 79 Targeted investigations
use traditional law enforcement tools, such as undercover operations,
search warrants, or confidential informant interviews, as part of an
investigation against a specific person or gang. 0 Anyone else law
enforcement encounters incident to these targeted investigations can
be logged into the database as a gang member or associate as long as
the individual meets the required criteria.1
However, the more
common gateway into the database is through conversations with law
enforcement known as "field interviews."2 The context of a field
interview is different in each community, and while some jurisdictions
favor a friendlier, less invasive approach, many field interviews involve
a search of the individual and may result in the individual receiving a
ticket or fine for a small violation. 3
Field interviews are always
reported as consensual or based on objective reasonable suspicion,
although researchers working with defense attorneys and individual
"gang members" have reported otherwise."

77.

See NAT'L GANG

78.
79.

Id.

CTR.,

supra note 76, at 3.

SEAN GARCIA-LEYS ETAL., U.C. IRVINE SCH. OF L. IMMIGR. RTs. CLINIC, MISLABELED:
ALLEGATIONS OF GANG MEMBERSHIP AND THEIR IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES 7 (2016)
[hereinafter GANG IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES REPORT], http://www.law.uci.edu/

academics/real-life-learning/clinics/ucilaw-irc-MislabeledReport.pdf.
80. See id. at 7 (exploring the different sources and collection practices of gang
membership data).
81. Id.
82. Hufstader, supra note 16, at 677.
83. See id. (reporting that in Las Vegas officers issued tickets to individuals they
perceived as uncooperative during a field interview, creating the opportunity to arrest
the suspected gang members in the future for the failure to pay the ticket).
84. See GANG IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES REPORT, supra note 79, at 7-8 (citing the
testimony of defense attorneys and alleged gang members that stops were not
consensual or based on reasonable suspicion because they "usually happen[] without
any court oversight or nexus with a specific crime"); Hufstader, supra note 16, at 677
(recounting a jurisdiction with a more aggressive approach to consensual field
interviews, including using multiple squad cars to approach individuals and searching
them in the prone position).
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After the field interviews are completed, individuals who hit the
required number of criteria enumerated in the statute may be entered
into a database as gang members.s" Officers record biographical and
identifying information for each individual interviewed, such as name,
date of birth, address, workplace, identifying tattoos, and social
security numbers.8 6 Entries are also created for individuals the police
observe but do not engage with in an interview.17 Field interview or
field observation information should indicate which of the statutory
gang membership criteria the individual exhibits, thereby justifying
the database entry; in reality, the criteria are broad enough that little
prevents police from entering individuals into databases."8
For
example, in California, an individual's entry into a state-wide database
only requires that he meet at least two of nine criteria.8 9 However,
some of California's criteria-such as "seen wearing gang dress" or
"seen affiliating with documented gang members"-bars very few
people from entry into the database, especially in neighborhoods
where gangs are enmeshed within the community and "gang dress" is
an expression of culture. 90
Individuals in these communities,
especially young men of color, 91 are likely to interact with police on a
regular basis, potentially accumulating criteria and entries into the
database without their knowledge.92 That means that individuals who

85. Hufstader, supra note 16, at 678 n.43 (noting that entry into the database is
governed by different statutes and policies in differentjurisdictions).
86. Id. at 678.
87. See id.
88. See GANG IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES REPORT, supra note 79, at 7; see also
Hufstader, supra note 16, at 679-80 (listing differing criteria requirements per different
state statutes, such as Texas's requirement that an individual meet two of eight criteria
before entry into a local or regional gang database versus Minnesota's requirement
that every individual have a criminal conviction before entry into its Gang Pointer File).
89. GANG IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES REPORT, supra note 79, at 7.
90. See id. at 3, 7-8 (asserting that, in California, gang criteria are easily met,
disproportionately established in neighborhoods of color, and rarely rooted in
objectively reasonable suspicion).
91. See id. at 3 (finding 99,000 of the 106,000, or roughly 1 in 140, of the boys and
men between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four listed in the California gang database,
CalGang, are men of color); cf MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 103, 123 (rev. ed. 2012) (arguing, in
the context of the War on Drugs, that law enforcement discretion in applying enforcement
criteria generally allows for the perpetuation of racial stereotypes and explains why the
majority of people swept into the criminal justice system are young men of color).
92. See Hufstader, supra note 16, at 681 (noting that "an individual living in a
heavily policed area could accumulate" gang interview cards or database entries that
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have never been arrested, or arrested but never formally charged,
likely have no notice that they are listed in a gang database; they also
likely have no notice that the government will charge and treat them
as gang members if they commit a crime or find themselves in removal
proceedings.
Even if individual noncitizens have been arrested or
charged, police often designate this information as confidential, and
only one state statute requires that the police notify an individual of
his gang designation.94

2. Federalpartnerships
While the federal criminal code defines a "criminal street gang,"9
ICE officials follow a separate, broader definition in its enforcement
action guidelines.96 The federal statute requires five or more persons
to form a gang; in contrast, ICE only requires the "association of three
or more individuals.., whose members collectively identify
themselves by adopting a group identity... to engage in criminal
activity which uses violence or intimidation to further its criminal
objectives. 9 7 However, because the INA does not authorize ICE to
remove gang members specifically, ICE must collaborate with state and
local law enforcement to locate and target immigrant gang members
eligible for removal.
Following the local and federal anti-gang collaborative efforts in the
1990s and the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, ICE launched
Operation Community Shield in March 2005.98 Originally created to
disrupt activities of the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang,99 Operation

exist in the system regardless of whether they should be removed or if the individual
is no longer involved in the gang).
93. See id. at 680 (highlighting the general inability of individuals to become
informed of their status as a gang database member because the data is often
considered "confidential" and not available to the public).
94. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.34(d) (1) (West 2017). To date, California is the
only state that requires law enforcement to notify an individual when he or she is
designated as a gang member.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2012).
96. See What is a Gang?, supra note 76.
97. Id.
98. See Chac6n, supra note 44, at 327-29 (recounting the creation and original
mandate of Operation Community Shield).
99. MS-13 originated in immigrant neighborhoods in Los Angeles in the 1980s, but
the gang has expanded prolifically since that time.
MS-13, INSIGHT CRIME,
http://www.insightcrime.org/el-salvador-organized-crime-news/mara-salvatrucha-ms13-profile (last updated Mar. 9, 2017). Migrating with deportees, the gang's reach now
extends throughout North and Central America. Id. The gang's ubiquity at all levels
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Community Shield's mandate has expanded to an "international effort
to disrupt and dismantle violent and dangerous transnational street
1
gangs" by targeting "all violent gang members nationwide.""
ICE
originally targeted MS-13 because most members were foreign-born,
were present in the United States illegally, had prior criminal
convictions rendering them deportable, and/or were involved in
crimes that subjected them to ICE's authority.0 1
Operation
Community Shield's mandate added additional gangs over subsequent
years, but locating and removing MS-13 and other transnational gangs
10 2
remain the focus.
Through Operation Community Shield, ICE uses local and state law
enforcement data to locate, investigate, prosecute, and remove
crimmigrant gang members. This partnership is beneficial to ICE
because it allows ICE to use local and state investigations and police
work to create non-citizen target lists.103 The partnership is beneficial
to local law enforcement because ICE can bring immigration charges
against individuals suspected of gang membership but beyond the
reach of criminal prosecution.1°' Once ICE has pulled a name from a

of society has destabilized the Northern Triangle, making it the most violent region in
the world that is not at war. Id. In 2012, the U.S. Department of the Treasury labeled
the group a "transnational criminal organization," the first time the designation has
been awarded to a U.S. street gang. Id. See generally Chac6n, supra note 44, at 328-29
(describing MS-13's origins as "more a U.S. phenomenon than a Central American import").
100. Operation Community Shield: Efforts to Dismantle Violent Street Gangs Remain a
Priority 10 Years On, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://www.ice.gov/features/community-shield
(recounting the growth and
accomplishments of Operation Community Shield since its inception in 2005); see also
Chac6n, supra note 44, at 329.
101. See Chac6n, supra note 44, at 329 (quoting the rationale for targeting MS-13
provided in ICE's March 10, 2006, Operation Community Shield press release).
102. See id. (reporting that as of 2007, "ICE's public literature no longer provides
any rationale for targeting these or any other 'gangs,' nor does it offer any explanation
of the criteria that are applied to determine gang membership").
103. Id. at 329-30; NationalGang Unit: Overview, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/national-gang-unit (last visited Oct. 23, 2017); see also GANG
IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES REPORT, supranote 79, at 8 (reporting that confidentiality
laws do not prevent local law enforcement from sharing gang database entries with
other agencies, including ICE, on a need-to-know basis).
104. See Sarah Maslin Nir & Arielle Dollinger, 39 Members of MS-13 Are Arrested,
Authorities Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/
nyregion/msl3-gang-members-arrested.html (quoting a local police chief describing
the local-federal partnership as "another tool in the tool box" because when local
police lack the evidence to make a criminal arrest, ICE can arrest suspected gang
members on immigration charges).

2017]

FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR

database, it can use immigration law violationsO° to remove individuals
suspected of street gang membership "even where state law provides
no possible basis for criminally prosecuting those individuals."' 106
Criminal convictions are not required for state and local officials to
turn suspected gang members over to ICE, and ICE is not bound by
each state's gang database criteria, notification procedures, or data
and privacy maintenance requirements. 7
The designation of "gang member" has no uniform definition or
accompanying set of conduct by which an immigration judge can
weigh the designation's importance in an individual case. Importing
local and state gang lists means that ICE also imports each
jurisdiction's methods, definitions, and criteria for identifying
crimmigrant gang members.108 Research into the mechanics of gang
databases shows that law enforcement officers are given significant
discretion and a broad range of qualifying criteria when deciding
whom to enter into a database.109 As stated above, criteria across
jurisdictions range from an individual's own admission of gang
membership or convictions for gang-related offenses to evidence that
an individual frequents an area associated with gang activity. 110
However, because the INA does not define "gang member" or provide
a standard of conduct, DHS can proffer gang allegations from
disparate parts of the country into immigration proceedings with no
standards against which an immigration judge can compare. For
example, in many localities, an individual can be legally entered into a
database using that jurisdiction's statutory criteria even though he
never committed a crime. Furthermore, without a federal benchmark
or definition against which to measure one's conduct, individuals lack
notice that their conduct may place them on an ICE target list.1

105. See Chac6n, supra note 44, at 329-30; 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (6) (A) (2012) (stating
that a non-citizen who arrives in the United States or who is present in the United
States "without being admitted or paroled.., is inadmissible"); 8 U.S.C. § 1227
(a) (2) (A) (iii) (stating that "any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any
time after admission is deportable").
106. See Chac6n, supra note 44, at 332.
107. See id. at 331-32.
108. Id. at 330.
109. See Hufstader, supra note 16, at 678-79; supra Section I.B.1 (examining the
statutory criteria used by various states to collect gang member information).
110. See Hufstader, supra note 16, at 679.
111. See id. at 695-96 (proposing that the use of this data in immigration court does not
provide adequate notice to noncitizens, in violation of the "void for vagueness" doctrine).
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ICE's use of state target lists and data is also important because any
errors or issues at the state level will be transmitted directly to ICE.

While there is ample anecdotal evidence of the high error rates within
city and state gang databases, 112 a recent audit of California's state
database, CalGang, casts doubt upon other similarly maintained
databases. In the largest audit of a state gang database to date, auditors
reported that thirteen of every one hundred entries in the CalGang
database lacked the required evidence to support the entry. '

Additionally, the audit revealed forty-two individuals younger than one
year of age at the time of entry into the database; the database reported
that twenty-eight of those infants had "admit[ted]" to gang

membership. 1
The audit also found that gang entries were not
reviewed every five years and deleted if the individual was inactive, as
required by state law. 1 ' Overall, the report concluded that CalGang's

"current oversight structure does not ensure that law enforcement
agencies ... collect and maintain criminal intelligence in a manner
that preserves individuals' privacy rights."1 6 In response to the audit,
California enacted legislation to reform the database entries, address
7

11
errors, and provide notice to individuals listed as gang members.
While this audit and legislation only bind California, many states share
similar database entry practices and oversight mechanisms.1 8

112. See generally Dacia Anderson, Chapter 797: Un-HandcuffingMinors from the Gang
Life, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 561, 567 (2014) (detailing the low threshold standards for
entry into a gang membership database and the inaccuracies this creates); GANG
IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES REPORT,

supra note 79, at 10-11 (arguing that CalGang is

overinclusive); Hufstader, supra note 16, at 689 (asserting that state gang databases are
not sufficiently accurate or safeguarded to warrant their increased use in immigration
enforcement).
113. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, THE CALGANG CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM: AS THE
RESULT OF ITS WEAK OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE, IT CONTAINS QUESTIONABLE INFORMATION

THAT MAY VIOLATE INDIVIDUALS' PRIVACY RIGHTS 1, 2 (2016) [hereinafter CALGANG
AUDIT], https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3010637-CalGang-Audit.html.
114. State Audit Affirms ACLU of California Concerns on Gang Database, ACLU OF
NORTHERN CAL. (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.aclunc.org/news/state-audit-affirmsaclu-california-concerns-gang-database.
115. See CALGANG AUDIT, supra note 113, at 3.
116. Id. (letter from Elaine Howle, Cal. State Auditor, to the Governor of Cal.,
President pro Tempore of the Senate, and Speaker of the Senate).
117. Infra Section III.A (proposing legislative solutions to the privacy and due
process issues presented by using gang database information in immigration court).
118. See generally Ali Winston, Markedfor Life: U.S. Government Using Gang Databases
to Deport Undocumented Immigrants,INTERCEPT (Aug. 11, 2016), https://theintercept.com/
2016/08/11/u-s-government-using-gang-databases-to-deport-undocumented-
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C. The Use of GangData in Removal Proceedings
The notice and due process concerns raised by gang databases apply
equally to noncitizens and citizens,119 but for immigrants living without
legal immigration status, with criminal records, or both, the "gang
member" designation has arguably graver consequences.120 While
removal proceedings may parrot criminal proceedings in many ways,
they differ significantly in the rules governing admissibility of evidence
and the due process protections available to individuals. With fewer
procedural protections, it is nearly impossible for a noncitizen to
meaningfully contest a gang allegation proffered by the government,
practically foreclosing the ability to receive a full and fair hearing on
his application for discretionary relief.
1. Statutory requirements
The most important distinction between criminal proceedings and
removal proceedings is that removal proceedings are civil and
administrative. 21 In immigration court, DHS bears the burden of
showing that an individual is removable by "clear and convincing"
evidence122 rather than by the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
the government must overcome in criminal cases.1 21 If an individual
does not contest DHS's case for his removability but requests

immigrants [hereinafter Winston, Marked for Life] (describing the interconnected
nature of federal, state, and local reliance on GangNet software).
119. See Hufstader, supra note 16, at 695-96 (arguing that the criteria used to
populate gang databases should be "void for vagueness").
120. SeeWinston, MarkedforLife, supra note 118 (remarking on the extreme difficulty of
challenging an individual's designation as a gang member); see also Mi Winston, You May
Be in California'sGang Database and Not Even Know It, REVEAL NEWS (Mar. 23, 2016),
https://www.revealnews.org/article/you-may-be-in-californias-gang-database-and-noteven-know-it (detailing the issue of notice for individuals entered into gang databases);
Brodzinsky & Pilkington, supra note 35 (confirming the deaths of three unrelated
Honduran men in 2014 shortly after their deportation from the United States and
estimating that the actual number of murdered deportees is much higher).
121. See Lam, 14 1. & N. Dec. 168, 172 (B.I.A. 1972) (asserting that removal hearings
are administrative proceedings that are "civil in nature").
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (3) (A) (2012); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 42 (2009)
(modifying the government's burden of proof for deportability from the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of proof to the "clear and convincing" standard).
123. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (announcing that the Due Process
Clause requires that the government prove each element of the crime charged beyond
a reasonable doubt in a criminal case).
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discretionary relief, he bears the burden of proving his eligibility for
124
that form of relief.
An individual in removal proceedings "shall have a reasonable
opportunity" to examine the evidence against him and present
evidence on his own behalf,12' but there is no Sixth Amendment right
to representation in immigration court.1 26 Noncitizens in removal
proceedings may be represented by counsel, but counsel must be
retained at their own expense. 2 7 Removal proceedings may take place
before an immigration judge in person, through video conference,
through teleconference, or, in certain situations, without the
immigrant present.1 2 In practice, the majority of individuals proceed
before the immigration judge pro se due to the cost of retaining
1 29
counsel and the barriers to obtaining counsel from detention.
Immigration proceedings commence with the service of a document
called an NTA 10 to the noncitizen and the immigration court.3 An
NTA specifies the nature of the proceedings, the legal authority for the
proceedings, the location and date of the proceedings, the alleged acts
or conduct in violation of the law, the charges against the individual,
and the statutory provisions violated.13 2 If service of an NTA is
improper, if it does not contain the specific information required
under the INA, or if it contains factual inaccuracies, an individual or

124. § 1229a(c) (4) (A) (requiring a noncitizen to prove that he or she "satisfies the
applicable eligibility requirements" and "merits a favorable exercise of discretion" in
applications for relief from removal).
125. § 1229a(b) (4).
126. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963) (affirming that under the
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, states must provide counsel to represent
defendants who are unable to afford their own counsel in criminal cases).
127. See§ 1229a(b) (4) (A).
128. § 1229a(b)(2)-(3).
129. See generally Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study ofAccess to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PENN. L. REv. 1, 2 (2015) (finding that only thirty-seven
percent of immigrants secured representation in 1.2 million deportation cases
between 2007 and 2012).
130. § 1229(a) (1) (requiring written notice of the charges against the individual
through service by mail or to the individual's counsel of record); see also DHS Notice to
AppearForm 1-862, DEP'T OF JUSTICE (updated Jan. 13, 2015), https://wwwjustice.gov/
eoir/dhs-notice-appear-form-i-862 (displaying a sample NTA).
131. AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS'N, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE POINTERS 518 (2014-15 ed.)
[hereinafter IMMIGR. PRACTICE POINTERS] (explaining that immigration proceedings
officially commence when an NTA is filed with the immigration court).
132. § 1229(a)(1) (A)-(D).
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an individual's lawyer may contest an NTA. 1 Contesting an NTA may
preserve the right to appeal, lead to the termination of removal
proceedings, preserve the individual's eligibility for certain forms of
relief, and allow an individual to contest his detention.3 4
When preparing an NTA, DHS also prepares the 1-213. The 1-213 is
often conceptualized as the police report of removal proceedings
because the information contained in the 1-213 usually forms the basis
for DHS's decision to issue an NTA. 5 The ICE agent interviewing the
individual in immigration custody typically fills out the 1-213, and the
form may include biographic, immigration, criminal, health, and
humanitarian information that does not appear in an NTA. 6 Unlike
the NTA, DHS is not required to share the 1-213 with the noncitizen at
any point in the removal proceedings. 7 1-213s often contain
damaging information about the individual that DHS submits to the
immigration court to support its claims regarding the individual's
alleged alienage and removability.3
The 1-213 is a common way for
gang database entries to enter the record.3 9
While an individual may contest the information contained in the
1-213 and request that the immigrationjudge exclude it from evidence,
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 40 has held that the 1-213 is

133. See IMMIGR. PRACTICE POINTERS, supra note 131, at 519-20 (outlining proper
NTA service).
134. See id. at 519 (listing possible benefits to contesting an NTA, such as holding
DHS to its burden of proof, preserving the respondent's rights on appeal, terminating
removal proceedings, and assisting the respondent in contesting mandatory detention).
135. See Mary Holper, Confronting Cops in Immigration Court, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS.J. 675, 695 (2015).
136.

See id.; IMMIGR. PRACTICE POINTERS, supra note 131, at 523-24.

137. Seeid. at 518.
138. Id. at 524.
139. Id.; see GANG IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES REPORT, supra note 79, at 6
(recounting a client's classification in the 1-213 as a gang member, which made him
ineligible for bond and placed him in "high security" detention); Winston, Markedfor
Life, supra note 118 (reporting that DHS attorneys often characterize gang members
as threats to public safety, placing their 1-213 forms in color-coded folders to denote
the risk and asking judges to withhold bond). Conversations between the author, Ali
Winston, and several immigration attorneys in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and
Virginia region also confirm DHS's use of gang allegations in the 1-213, even if the
individual has not been formally charged with any crime involving gang activity. Id.
140. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is the appellate body governed by
the Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review. The BIA has
nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals from certain decisions rendered by
immigration judges and by DHS district directors. Unless modified or overruled by
the Attorney General or a federal court, BIA decisions are binding on all immigration
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inherently credible.141 If an individual rebuts the trustworthiness of
14 2
the 1-213, it violates due process for immigration judges to rely on it.
In practice, it is extremely difficult to challenge the 1-213 because DHS
is not required to share the form with the individual in advance of his
appearance before the immigration judge and an individual is not
entitled to the right to cross-examine the author of the 1-213.143
Therefore, absent evidence that an officer obtained the information
under duress or coercion or that the information contains factual
error, the form is usually admitted. 44
2. The role of discretion
Immigration judges presiding over removal or bond hearings are
given broad discretion to look beyond the statutory requirements of
an individual's case and assess his character.1 4' A legal finding of "good
moral character" is required for all forms of removal relief except one,
and the most requested forms of relief-asylum, cancelation of
removal, adjustment of status, and voluntary departure-include a
discretionary component in addition to statutory requirements. 46

judges and DHS officers. Board of lmmigr. Appeals, DEP'TOFJUSTICE (last updated Oct.
2, 2017), https://wwwjustice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals.
141. See Toro, 17 1. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (B.I.A.1980) (holding that "to be admissible
in deportation proceedings, evidence must be probative and its use fundamentally fair
so as to not deprive respondents of due process of law"); Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609,
611 (B.I.A. 1988) (affirming that, in deportation cases, the "tests for the admissibility
of documentary evidence in deportation proceedings are that evidence must be
probative and that its use must be fundamentally fair"); infra Section I.C.4 (discussing
the fundamental fairness standard for evidence in immigration proceedings).
142. See Pouhova v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (7th Cir. 2013); Holper, supra
note 135, at 695.
143. See IMMIGR. PRACTICE POINTERS, supranote 131, at 524 (noting that 1-213 forms
commonly contain source issues, lack of detail, and significant gaps in time between
when the information was collected and when the 1-213 was created); see Holper, supra
note 135, at 726-27 (arguing for the right to cross-examine and confront one's accuser
in immigration court).
144. See Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 340.
145. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2012) (listing the grounds of disqualification from a
finding of "good moral character" but noting that an immigration judge may still find
persons outside the listed categories are not of "good moral character"); 8 C.F.R.
§ 316.10 (2017) (stating that an applicant for naturalization bears the burden of
demonstrating that he or she has been and continues to be a person of good moral
character, as determined on a case-by-case basis, which includes examining the statutory
requirements and the standards of the average citizen in the community of residence).
146. FACT SHEET: FORMS OF RELIEF FROM REMOVAL, DEP'T OFJUSTICE 1-3 (2004),
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Immigration judges are well suited to make discretionary
determinations because they review a noncitizen's history, the
evidence against him, and any presented testimony.
Discretionary forms of relief are comprised of the threshold
statutory requirements that an individual must meet and the discretion
of the immigration judge. For example, lawful permanent residents
must show the following requirements to be statutorily eligible for
cancelation of removal: five years of permanent residency; at least
seven years of continuous presence after lawful admission; and no
aggravated felony convictions, which would preclude a finding of good
moral character. 147 If an individual demonstrates his eligibility by
proving each statutory element listed above, he must then persuade
the immigration judge that he deserves relief based on his personal
14
history, positive characteristics, and good moral character. 1
The BIA has repeatedly stated that discretionary relief must be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis because it would be difficult and
undesirable to establish a bright-line rule.1 49 In In re C-V-T-, 1 5 the BIA
articulated the following factors that courts consider when weighing
an individual's positive equities: family ties within the United States,
length of residence, service in the U.S. armed forces, employment
history, property or business ties, evidence of value and service to the
community, proof of genuine rehabilitation (if a criminal record
exists), and other evidence attesting to good character.15 Conversely,
the following factors will weigh against an individual: the existence
and nature of a criminal record, the recency and seriousness of the
criminal record, additional significant violations of U.S. immigration
laws, and "the presence of other evidence indicative of a respondent's
bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident. '' 15 2 For many
of the immigrants facing removal based on alleged gang participation,

https://wwwjustice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2004/08/05/ReliefFromRe
moval.pdf.
147. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f), 1229b(a) (precluding a finding of good moral
character for individuals with aggravated felony convictions).
148. See C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998) (applying the principle
established in Main that an immigration judge deciding whether to grant
discretionary relief "must balance adverse factors evidencing the alien's undesirability
as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented in his
[or her] behalf' (alteration in original)).
149. Id. at 12.
150. 22 I. & N. Dec. 7 (B.I.A. 1998).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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discretionary relief is the only form of relief available because they are
undocumented, have been previously deported, entered unlawfully
after 2014, or have a criminal record."'
In addition to the immigration judge's ultimate discretion as to
whether to grant relief, another important discretionary decision in
which gang database allegations play an influential role is the bond
determination hearing. Individuals with aggravated felonies or other
serious criminal convictions are subject to mandatory detention under
the INA, but other noncitizens are eligible for bond, dependent on the
case they present to the immigration judge."' The decision to issue
bond or mandate detention "may be based upon any information that
is available to the Immigration Judge or that is presented to him or
her" by the noncitizen or by DHS. 55 Other than removal hearings,
bond hearings are the most common place for DHS to present an
immigration judge with alleged gang data,"56 often with determinative
consequences for the noncitizen. First and foremost, receiving bond
allows the noncitizen the chance to remain with his family outside of
detention as he prepares for his case. 57 Second, an individual's
chances of winning his case increase significantly if he is not detained
because release from detention significantly increases his odds of

153. See Enforcement Priority Memo 2014, supra note 6, at 3-4 (listing recent arrivals
and certain immigrants convicted or suspected of crimes as Priority 1 for removal and
immigrants convicted of misdemeanors as Priority 2).
154. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
155. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (2017).
156. See Holper, supra note 135, at 689-90 (highlighting that gang databases lead to
increased gang membership allegations, which cause immigration judges to deny
bond even if the individual was never prosecuted for the alleged gang activity); GANG
IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES REPORT, supra note 79, at 6 (detailing the story of a
noncitizen who was detained and experienced hardship after being incorrectly labeled
a gang member); Winston, Markedfor Life, supra note 118 (reporting that DHS uses
color-coded folders for the 1-213 to indicate to the immigration judge when to
withhold bond due to gang membership or other risk).
157. See, e.g., Marwa Eltagouri et al., A Rare Look at Life Inside One of the ChicagoArea's
2 ICE Immigration Detention Centers, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 24, 2017, 12:00 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/immigration/ct-immigrants-mchenrydetention-center-met-20170323-story.html (reporting on families torn apart as a result
of the detention process); Patrick G. Lee, Immigrants in Detention Centers Are Often
Hundreds of Miles from Legal Help, PRO PUBLICA
(May
16,
2017),
https://www.propublica.org/article/immigrants-in-detention-centers-are-oftenhundreds-of-miles-from-legal-help (reporting on the difficulties detained immigrants
face in securing representation and quoting a Texas advocate's opinion that "it's been
a strategic move by ICE to construct detention centers in rural areas" away from legal
representation networks).
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securing counsel.ls' Between 2007 and 2012, out of 1.2 million
deportation cases, a mere fourteen percent of noncitizens in detention
were represented.1 5 9 With an attorney, a noncitizen's likelihood of
winning relief are five-and-a-half times greater than those who proceed
without representation. 60 Finally, individuals listed as gang members
and denied bond may face additional dangers in the detention center
itself, such as placement in high security units with restricted privileges
and violent offenders. 61
3. Due process for noncitizens
The debate regarding what due process rights, if any, are available
to noncitizens seeking entry to or fighting removal from the United
States is as old as the country itself. While the Constitution does not
expressly name a federal immigration power, a series of nineteenthcentury Supreme Court rulings provide the legal foundation for
Congress's plenary power to determine which noncitizens to exclude
or deport, with very deferential judiciary review. 162 The establishment
of the plenary power doctrine is the reason behind the Supreme
Court's deference to the legislative and executive branches regarding
decisions to exclude or favor the admission of certain groups of
noncitizens, even when such discrimination would violate
constitutional norms in other areas of law. 16' Today, the plenary power
doctrine empowers Congress to determine what due process

158.

See Esther Yu His Lee, Only 37 Percent of Immigrants Have Legal Representation,

THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 29, 2016, 2:40 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/immigrants-

legal-representation-39a5f7dbd434 ("[0]nly [two] percent of people without lawyers
were able to successfully avoid deportation.").
159. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 129, at 2.
160. Id.
161. GANG IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES REPORT, supra note 79, at 6 (reporting that
a client DHS alleged was a gang member was placed in the "high security" detention
after he was denied bond).
162. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 41, at 136 (citing the Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), and Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), as the three basic building blocks of the
congressional plenary power over immigration).
163. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (observing that
congressional and executive policy concerning aliens is "so exclusively entrusted to the
political branches of the government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference"); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Congressional Plenay
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REv. 255, 255 (1984) (noting that the Supreme Court has
historically declined to review "even those immigration provisions that explicitly
classify on such disfavored bases as race, gender, and legitimacy").
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protections apply to noncitizens seeking entry to the United States,164
but the Fifth Amendment guarantees due process rights for
noncitizens present in the United States.16 Due process protections in
removal proceedings also differ depending on what procedure the
noncitizen is requesting. While courts have consistently held that a
noncitizen has no protected liberty or property interest in receiving
purely discretionary immigration relief,166 the Supreme Court has
upheld a liberty interest in the right to apply for discretionary
immigration relief 16 7 and the right to a full and fair removal hearing,
no matter the relief requested. 6 '
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on due process protections for
noncitizens has slowly evolved over the past two hundred years. In the
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court characterized Congress's
authority over immigration in absolutist terms. In Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 6 9 also known as the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Supreme
Court held that the right to exclude noncitizens from the United States
was a congressional right inherent in the exercise of sovereign
power. 170 A few years later, Fong Yue Ting v. United States171 addressed
whether Congress's authority extended to the right to deport
noncitizens already residing in the United States.1 72 Following the
passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1892, Fong Yue Ting, a
164. Shaughnessy v. United States ex re. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
165. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)
(affirming that "the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent"). Compare Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (stating in dicta that "aliens who have
once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings
conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law"),
with Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982) (asserting that "courts must
evaluate the particular circumstances and determine what procedures would satisfy the
minimum requirements of due process on the reentry of a permanent resident alien"
and applying the due process balancing test announced in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
166. Patel v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 216, 220 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e have previously
held that' [t]he failure to be granted discretionary relief [such as voluntary departure]
does not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest."' (alterations in original)
(quoting Ali v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 407, 412 (6th Cir. 2004)).
167. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 307-08 (2001).
168. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32-33.
169. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
170. Id. at 603-04.
171. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
172. Id. at 698.
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Chinese immigrant residing in the United States before the Act, was
denied a certificate of residency and ordered deported. 171 In response
to Ting's habeas petition, the Supreme Court held that Congress has
an absolute right to deport non-naturalized foreignersjust as it has an
absolute right to deny noncitizens entrance into the country.1 74 The
Court declared that deportation was a civil penalty rather than a
criminal punishment, and therefore, it does not require the same level
7
of procedural due process protections as criminal proceedings.' 5
Over time, the Court has acknowledged that deportation is a very harsh
penalty for immigrants and perhaps more devastating than criminal
1 77
punishment,1 76 but the holding in Fong Yue Ting remains good law.
With Congress's power to both exclude and deport noncitizens
solidified, the subsequent one hundred years of procedural due process
1 78
jurisprudence maintained the plenary power. In Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
a German citizen, Knauff, fled Germany during the war and eventually
married a U.S. citizen.179 Upon Knauff's attempt to naturalize and
enter the United States in 1948, she was excluded and detained
without a hearing solely based on the Attorney General's finding that
her admission would harm the interests of the United States.8 0 When
she filed a writ of habeas corpus, the Court held that an immigrant
seeking entry into the United States requests a privilege and has no
constitutional rights to due process if the United States denies the
privilege." 1 Reaffirming the plenary power, the Court declared that
"[w] hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process
as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." ' 2 A few years later, in
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 83 a resident of over twenty years
was barred from returning to the United States after he remained
abroad for nineteen months. 4 When he returned to the United States,

173. Id. at 702.
174. Id. at 713-14.
175. Id. at 730.
176. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 164 (1945) (noting that the consequences
of deportation range from the loss of family, friends, and a livelihood to poverty,
persecution, and death).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Mendoza, 985 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1993).
178. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
179. Id. at 539.
180. Id. at 539-40.
181. Id. at 542, 544.
182. Id. at 544.
183. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
184. Id. at 208.

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:269

he was excluded on security grounds and subsequently stranded on
Ellis Island when no other country would accept him."'a When he
challenged his exclusion, the Court held that his exclusion was a valid
exercise of Congress's plenary power,186 and the Due Process Clause did
not give him a right to review the secret evidence against him. 87
The Supreme Court's more recent cases involving noncitizens
seeking due process protections have indicated some willingness to
deviate from the plenary power doctrine and apply the modern
procedural due process analysis to noncitizens. Although it did not
involve noncitizens, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 88 the Court provided for the
first time the analysis for determining what procedural process is due
to an individual or group when a constitutionally protected interest is
at stake. 8 9 At issue in Goldberg was whether procedural due process
required a pre-termination hearing before recipients of public welfare
lost their benefits.1 9 Holding that due process entitled the recipients
to a pre-termination hearing, the Court balanced the interest of the
welfare recipients in their benefit and requested procedures, the
interest of the government in maintaining the current procedures and
any potential burden the requested procedure might add, and the risk
to the individual of erroneous deprivation. 191
In Mathews v. Eldridge,1 92 the Supreme Court further clarified the
Goldberg analysis when it addressed whether due process prohibited
terminating an individual's social security disability benefits without a
pre-deprivation hearing.1 9
Applying the balancing factors from
Goldberg,194 the Court held that because benefit termination was based
on an assessment of evidence by doctors and that the recipients had
other means of livelihood if the government erroneously terminated
their benefits, due process did not require an in-person, pretermination hearing.19' The Court also stated the test for determining

185. Id.
186. Id. at 216.
187. Id. at 212. Note that due to the attention their cases received, the BIA
eventually granted relief from exclusion to both Knauff and Mezei. See LEGOMSKY &
RODRIGUEZ, supra note 41, at 144.
188. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
189. Id. at 266.
190. Id. at 260.
191. Id. at 264-66.
192. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
193. Id. at 323.
194. Goldberg,397 U.S. at 264-65.
195. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340-41, 349.
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the minimum due process procedures required in a civil case before
the government can take away a benefit or right, which remains the
test today.196 On a case-by-case basis,19 7 courts must balance the
following factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation to the individual under the current procedures
and the value of providing additional procedural safeguards; and (3)
the government interest, including avoiding fiscal or administrative
burdens, in using the current procedures rather than additional or
proposed procedures.9 8
Six years later, the Supreme Court applied the Mathews test for the
first time to the deprivation of residence in the United States. In
Landon v. Plasencia,9 9 Plasencia was a native of El Salvador before she
entered the United States as a legal permanent resident in 1970.200 She
later married a U.S. citizen and had children. 0 1 In 1975, Plasencia and
her husband traveled to Mexico, and on their return, she was stopped
and placed in exclusion proceedings for attempting to smuggle other
migrants over the border.0 2 In its holding, the Court affirmed that
legal permanent residents have greater constitutional rights than
immigrants seeking entry into the country for the first time.0 3 Then,
the Court applied the Mathews test and held that Plasencia was entitled
to deportation proceedings, rather than exclusion proceedings,
because the immense personal interest at stake entitled her to stronger
due process protections.2 4 The Court remanded the case to "evaluate
the particular circumstances and determine what procedures would
satisfy the minimum requirements of due process on the reentry of a
permanent resident alien. 20
196. Id. at 335; see, e.g., Panzella v. Sposato, 863 F.3d 210, 218 (2d Cir. 2017)
(applying the Mathews balancing test).
197. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (stating
that "the very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation").
198. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
199. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
200. Id. at 23.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 32.
204. Id. at 34. Before the 1996 Amendments created "removal proceedings,"
noncitizens who had entered the United States were entitled to a deportation hearing,
which provided greater procedural safeguards. A noncitizen who had not entered the
United States or was seeking re-entry, as the government argued Plasencia was, received
fewer procedural due process protections and were placed in exclusion proceedings.
205. Id. at 35.
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Finally, while the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply
to noncitizens in immigration court, a recent ruling may indicate a
shift in the Court's immigration jurisprudence." 6
In Padilla v.
Kentucky,2 7 the Court acknowledged that deportations rooted in
criminal convictions are unique in the spectrum of civil penalties
because of their relationship and resemblance to criminal sanctions."'
In Padilla,an attorney incorrectly advised his client, a legal permanent
resident who had lived in the United States for more than forty years,
that a criminal conviction would not trigger his deportation.0 9 Upon
his conviction and order of deportation, Padilla filed a Sixth
Amendment claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 21 The Court
declared that advising noncitizen clients of potential immigration
consequences was not categorically removed from the ambit of the
Sixth Amendment and held that the attorney's failure to correctly
advise the defendant of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea
amounted to constitutionally deficient counsel.211
The Court
remanded the case to the Kentucky courts for the determination of
Padilla's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.21 2 Although it appears
in dicta, the acknowledgement of the "enmeshed" nature of criminal
convictions and civil immigration court proceedings and the severity
of removal as a penalty marks an important deviation in the Court's
immigration jurisprudence.2
Immigration scholars and advocates

206. See Peter L. Markowitz, DeportationIs Different, 13 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 1299, 1332,
1351 (2011) (positing that Padilla v. Kentucky marks a "critical pivot point" in the
Court's immigration jurisprudence because it acknowledges the "quasi-criminal"
nature of deportation).
207. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
208. Id. at 365-66.
209. Id. at 359.
210. Id. at 360; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984) (setting
forth a two-pronged test for a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim: (1) the
counsel's representation must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(2) but for counsel's errors there must be a reasonable probability that the proceeding
results would have been different).
211. Padilla,559 U.S. at 366, 374.
212. Id. at 375, remanded to 381 S.W.3d 322 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (vacating Padilla's
conviction and holding that if Padilla had been properly advised of the deportation
consequences of his plea, he would have made the rational decision to proceed to trial).
213. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365-66 (emphasizing that deportation is "intimately
related" to the criminal process, especially as modern immigration law has "enmeshed
criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation"); Markowitz, supra note 206, at
1332-33 (noting that although the Court's discussion of deportation remains dicta, it
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view the Padilla ruling as an important "pivot" in immigration
jurisprudence and as an indication of "the Court's crescendoing
discomfort with the asymmetric incorporation of criminal justice
norms into deportation proceedings" without accompanying criminal
justice protections.2 1 4
4. The fundamentalfairnessevidentiay standard
While the civil nature of immigration proceedings offers noncitizens
fewer constitutional protections than criminal court proceedings,
individuals in removal proceedings are entitled to a full and fair
hearing under the Fifth Amendment.2 1
Immigration proceedings
must provide a noncitizen with notice and a reasonable opportunity to
examine the evidence against him so as to "conform to the Fifth
Amendment's requirement of due process.''16 The evidence admitted
in immigration proceedings, however, is not governed by the Federal
Rules of Evidence but by a fundamental fairness standard.1 7 Under
this standard, evidence will be admitted in immigration proceedings as
2 18
fundamentally fair if it is reliable, probative, and lawfully obtained.
The fundamental fairness evidentiary standard differs from the
Federal Rules of Evidence in a few significant ways. First, hearsay
evidence is admissible in immigration court if it passes the
fundamental fairness threshold. 21 9'
The admission of hearsay is

marks a significant change in the Court's concept of deportation when viewed within
immigration jurisprudence as a whole).
214. Markowitz, supra note 206, at 1339, 1350 (predicting that the Court's
characterization of deportation as somewhere in-between the civil and criminal
systems will "require the Court to grapple with the hard question of what other types
of criminal protections should be afforded to respondents in deportation
proceedings").
215. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (reiterating that immigrants
in removal proceedings are entitled to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment);
Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011) ("A full and fair hearing is
one of the due process rights afforded to aliens in deportation proceedings.").
216. Salgado-Diaz v. Gonzales, 395 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2005).
217. See Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (B.I.A. 1980) (noting that relevance and
fundamental fairness "so as not to deprive respondents of due process of law" are the only
bars to admissibility of evidence in deportation cases); Lam, 14 I. & N. Dec. 168, 172
(B.I.A.1972) (defining the criterion in appraising documentary evidence lawfully obtained
as whether it has probative value and whether its use is consistent with a fair hearing).
218. See, e.g., Pouhova v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1007, 1011, 1013 (7th Cir. 2013).
219. See, e.g., Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (deeming
hearsay admissible in removal proceedings so long as its admission is probative and
not fundamentally unfair).
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important for immigrants accused of gang membership and seeking
discretionary relief because the BIA encourages immigration judges to
consult police reports and other hearsay evidence when weighing an
individual's equities. 220 Unlike a court that is governed by the Federal
Rules of Evidence,221 the BIA holds these forms of evidence as
probative of an individual's conduct, which is in turn probative of good
moral character, a statutory requirement for all discretionary grants of
relief.222 The judge's ability to glean an individual's character from his
conduct is why immigration courts consider nolle prosequi charges and
expunged convictions admissible and probative.2 23
Not only does the fundamental fairness standard deviate from the
Federal Rules of Evidence, it also deviates from the constitutional
principles governing the admission of evidence. While evidence
obtained in "violation of the law" can be fundamentally unfair, not all
violations will result in the exclusion of evidence. For example, the
Supreme Court specifically ruled that the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence DHS officials obtained
and proffered in immigration court.224 On the other hand, courts are
more likely to exclude as fundamentally unfair evidence officials
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and courts have ruled
some Fourth Amendment seizures to be "so egregious" that to rely on
the evidence would violate due process.22a
Once evidence is deemed fundamentally fair, the immigrationjudge
will admit it either as an official exhibit or as part of DHS's charging

220. Grijalva, 19 1. & N. Dec. 713, 722 (B.I.A. 1988) (expressing that admittingpolice
reports is especially appropriate in cases involving discretionary relief from deportation).
221. FED. R. EVID. 801-07 (2016).
222. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2012) (noting that an immigration judge may still find
persons outside the listed categories are not of "good moral character"); Parcham v.
INS, 769 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that evidence of an immigrant's
conduct, without conviction, may be considered in denying the discretionary relief of
voluntary departure).
223. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (48) (A) (defining "conviction" for immigration purposes
as any formal adjudication of guilt entered by a court, any finding of guilt by the judge
orjury, any admission of sufficient facts by the noncitizen that warrants a finding of
guilt, or any judge-ordered restraint on the noncitizen's liberty); Paredes-Urrestarazu
v. INS, 36 F.3d 801, 810 (9th. Cir. 1994) (explaining that the nature of a discretionary
grant permits the BIA to consider evidence of conduct that does not result in a conviction).
224. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (announcing that the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not bar the admission of illegally obtained
evidence from admission in a civil deportation proceeding).
225. See Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (B.I.A. 1980) (holding that evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment requires a case-by-case analysis).

2017]

FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR

documents, such as an NTA or 1-213. Information entered into the
record through the 1-213 or other charging document is considered
trustworthy unless the noncitizen provides counterevidence that law
enforcement obtained the information illegally or the information is
226
inherently untrustworthy.
II. USE OF ALLEGATIONS OF GANG MEMBERSHIP IN REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS EVIDENCE
STANDARD AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

In the spring and summer of 2017, federal immigration officials
conducted several high-profile raids focused solely on detecting,
detaining, and removing crimmigrant gang members.2 27 While ICE
touted the raids as successful, several alleged gang members targeted
by these raids and prior raids during the Obama Administration filed
federal lawsuits which enumerated concerns related to the underlying
data, the role of racial profiling in populating gang databases, and
alleged due process violations. 22' A plaintiff in one of the recently filed
suits, Chicago resident Luis Vicente Pedrote-Salinas, learned he was
listed as a gang member by Chicago police when he was arrested in
2011 in an Operation Community Shield Sweep. 229 Mr. PedroteSalinas has averred that he has never been a member of a gang and
that his due process rights were violated when the Chicago police
labeled him as a gang member and shared that erroneous designation
with ICE.2 ' 0 But for his gang designation, Mr. Pedrote-Salinas would
have been eligible for DACA and a U visa, which is available to
immigrants who have been victims of certain crimes. 21 He now faces
removal from the United States. 2
Admitting unsubstantiated gang database entries in removal
proceedings creates a fundamentally unfair hearing because the data
226. See Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609, 611 (B.I.A. 1988) (determining that absent
proof that an 1-213 contains information that is incorrect or was obtained by coercion
or duress, the document is inherently trustworthy and admissible as evidence to prove
alienage and deportability or inadmissibility).
227. See ICE-Led Gang Surge, supra note 20 (reporting that the Operation
Community Shield sweep resulted in the arrest of 1095 individuals confirmed as gang
members and affiliates).
228. See Thompson, supra note 66.
229. Id.; Complaint at 2, Pedrote-Salinas v. Johnson, No. 1:17-cv-05093 (N.D. Ill.
filedJuly 11, 2017).
230. Complaint at 14-15.
231. Id. at 2-3.
232. See Thompson, supra note 66.
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is untrustworthy and highly prejudicial. Due to the discretionary nature
of immigration relief, any piece of evidence admitted in a removal
hearing or bond determination could tip the scales for or against an
individual. Immigration judges have the difficult task of determining
which individual immigrants pose a threat to the community and should
be removed and which individuals contribute to their community and
should remain. On its face, an individual's presence in a gang database
would appear to be strong evidence that he presents a danger to the
community and therefore is unfit for a grant of discretionary relief.
However, the criteria and practices used to populate gang databases
make the probative value of an entry unclear.2 "
Evidence that is neither probative nor trustworthy fails to meet the
fundamental fairness standard and must be excluded from
immigration proceedings." 4 Unsubstantiated gang database entries
are fundamentally unfair because the data alone is unreliable and not
probative of whether an individual merits discretionary relief. Absent
additional corroboration or context, an immigration judge does not
know if a noncitizen's presence in a gang database is probative of
recent acts, old acts, bad behavior, innocuous behavior, database
mismanagement, error, or gang membership." Therefore, DHS must
omit unsubstantiated gang information from its case against an
individual to comport with due process requirements of the
fundamental fairness standard.
Additionally, DHS's use of unsubstantiated gang database entries as
evidence in a discretionary case creates a disparity in notice and fails
the Mathews test for minimum due process requirements in civil
deprivation proceedings. Individuals facing removal are guaranteed a
reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against them,2 6 but
gang membership allegations pulled from local and state databases are
never shared. Without notice of their designation as a gang member,
an individual cannot adequately prepare his application for relief.
This disparity in notice could be narrowed if DHS shared the
allegations of its discretionary case in addition to an NTA, allowing the
noncitizen the opportunity to prepare for the entirety of his case.
233. See supra notes 75-118 and accompanying text (explaining how gang databases
are populated in different states before that data is shared with federal immigration
officials).
234. See Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 343.
235. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (exploring the legal and
mechanical issues raised by gang database data collection and data sharing).
236. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) (4) (B) (2012).
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A. UnsubstantiatedGang Member Data Should Be Excludedfrom Removal
Proceedingsas Fundamentally Unfair Because It Fails to Meet the
FundamentalFairnessEvidentiary Standard
When a noncitizen requests discretionary relief from removal, case
law instructs immigration judges to consider any available evidence
that is fundamentally fair and probative of the nature, recency, and
severity of the individual's convictions or conduct, as well as any
evidence of bad character or genuine rehabilitation." 7 Fundamentally
fair evidence must be probative, trustworthy, and lawfully obtained.3 8
For example, hearsay evidence, such as a police report or law
enforcement database entry, is admissible in removal proceedings as
long as it is fundamentally fair.23 9
Data pulled from state gang databases is not probative of whether an
individual merits discretionary immigration relief because local and
state law enforcement officers employ discrepant criteria to identify
gang members and improperly exercise significant discretion when
designating individuals as gang members.
While the civil and
administrative nature of removal proceedings affords significant
discretion to the executive branch, this discretion is not intended for
use at the state and local level. 240 This is because local law enforcement
officers primarily gather gang information for investigative purposes
and the entries receive little oversight. 241 Furthermore, prosecutors
rarely use this data alone as direct evidence of gang membership in
court. 2 2 However, the current data-sharing agreements allow DHS to
put forward the same data in immigration court to make its case that
an individual is a gang member and therefore undeserving of bond or
relief from removal.243

237.

C-V-T-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998).
238. Pouhova v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1007, 1011, 1013 (7th Cir. 2013).
239. See Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing for the
admission of hearsay evidence in removal proceedings if the admission is probative
and not fundamentally unfair).
240. See Hufstader, supra note 16, at 689 (arguing that the immigration system
withholds discretion from local law enforcement by design and that allowing the use
of locally populated gang databases undermines this design and violates due process).
241. See GANG IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES REPORT, supra note 79, at 1.
242. Id.
243. See Holper, supra note 135, at 689-90 (stressing the danger of relying on police
data to make life-altering immigration decisions because, even if the data was not used
to prosecute a criminal charge, reports of gang membership influence discretionary
decisions in immigration court, such as whether to grant bond or relief from
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Divorced from the context of what conduct or criteria led to an
individual's designation as a gang member, it is far more difficult for
an immigration judge to assess if the data is probative to the
discretionary analysis. Discretionary relief is rooted in the idea that an
individual who behaved badly or dangerously in the past can reform
himself to a degree that he poses no threat to his community and
deserves the opportunity to remain in the United States.244 Further,
evidence is probative in the discretionary relief analysis only if it allows
the immigration judge to assess the conduct that led to an individual's
designation as a gang member, the recency of that conduct, and
whether the conduct is likely to continue. As noted in C-V-T-, a grant
of discretionary relief must consider proof of genuine rehabilitation if
a criminal record exists, plus other evidence that attests to the
individual's good character. 24"
The conduct that led to a "gang
member" designation could be as simple as being seen in the presence
of a known gang member in the individual's community, which could
have a myriad of innocent explanations, or conduct as serious as
furthering the gang's criminal businesses.246
Without further
corroboration of the conduct underlying the government's allegation
of gang membership or providing the individual an opportunity to
prepare counter-evidence by notifying them of this designation, the
probative value of that data to the immigration judge is unclear.247
Admitting this information without further corroboration has
implications beyond the courtroom. Individuals removed to countries
wracked by gang violence and painted as "gang members" are
stigmatized by society and remain at risk for overzealous enforcement

deportation); supraSection I.B.2 (discussing how state gang data is shared with federal
immigration officials).
244. See Emma Whitford, Lawyers Grapple with New Hardline Attitude in Trump-Era
Immigration Court, GOTHAMIST (Feb. 17, 2017, 11:55 AM), http://gothamist.com/
2017/02/17/trump ice immigration.php (explaining the judge's authority to make
discretionary decisions immigration court as "the idea that a judge can differentiate
between a jaywalker and a bank robber").

245.

C-V-T-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998).

246.

See supra Section I.B.1 (reviewing the statutory criteria governing many state

gang databases).
247. See Holper, supra note 135, at 675-76 (suggesting that all unsubstantiated
police reports and other similar data should be excluded from immigration
proceedings unless a noncitizen has the right to confront his accuser, the author of

the report); Kopan &Jarett, supra note 21 (observing that immigration judges find it
difficult to look beyond gang allegations "because discretion is paramount in

immigration court").
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by local police or extrajudicial violence by gangs.2 48
ICE has
acknowledged that it alerts Central American law enforcement
agencies when "gang members" are deported back to their countries
of origin, increasing the likelihood that an individual will face further
2 49
penalties upon arrival in his home country.
Temporal issues also reduce the probative value of database entries.
To determine if the noncitizen has presented "proof of genuine
rehabilitation," an immigration judge needs enough information to
assess the temporal relationship between incidents in a noncitizen's
history. 210 Several circuit courts have rejected admitted evidence in
immigration proceedings when there is a significant gap between the
time the data was gathered and the time it was entered into the 1-213,
holding that these gaps of time called the "inherent reliability" of the
form into serious doubt. 2 1 Data that DHS pulls from Operation
Community Shield to use in removal proceedings could be ten days
old or ten years old; without context, which is not usually provided in
an immigration proceeding, the data does not provide immigration
judges with the ability to interpret these gaps in time. 2
Temporal issues are exacerbated for individuals living in
neighborhoods plagued by gangs and in neighborhoods of color.
Noncitizen men of color are profiled and stopped by law enforcement
more frequently than other members of these neighborhoods,
subjecting them to numerous conversations with police. 211 In states

248. Kate Linthicum, Meet El Salvador's Growing Middle Class: Deporteesfrom the U.S.,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-elsalvador-deportees-20170226-story.html.
249. See Winston, Marked for Life, supra note 118 (relaying that ICE shares
information on gang-affiliated deportees with law enforcement authorities in Central
America or Mexico, which increases the likelihood that deportees will face violence
upon return, either at the hands of state authorities or gangs); see also Brodzinsky &
Pilkington, supra note 35 (reporting the stories of deported noncitizens who were
murdered upon their return to Central American countries).
250. C-V-T-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998).
251. See Pouhova v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a
seven-year lapse between a conversation with immigration officials and the preparation
of the 1-213 called the "inherent reliability" of the form into serious doubt).
252. See IMMIGR. PRACTICE POINTERS, supra note 131, at 524 (recording immigration
lawyers' complaints that 1-213s populated from gang databases suffer from source
issues, lack of detail, and significant gaps in time between when the information was
collected and when it is used in court).
253. See GANG IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES REPORT, supra note 79, at 1, 3 (finding
99,000 of the 106,000, or roughly 1 in 140, of the boys and men between the ages of
fifteen and thirty-four listed in the CalGang database are men of color); see also
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where database entries can result from contact with police that does
not end in arrest, an individual could have no memory of the
interaction that resulted in his designation as a gang member. 54
Furthermore, most state laws do not require an individual to receive
notice of his designation as a gang member.2 "5 Lacking notice, it is
possible that a noncitizen before an immigration judge for minor
crimes or only immigration violations could have no idea that he is
considered a gang member by local police, let alone federal
immigration authorities. In this circumstance, a noncitizen seeking
bond or discretionary relief will most likely be unable to provide the
context needed for an immigration judge to contextualize the gang
database entry.
Without additional corroborating information,
advance notice, and the chance to rebut the allegation, the temporal
issue presented by this data cannot be cured.
Finally, the data pulled from these databases carries an indicia of
unreliability because of the lack of standardization in the populating
of gang databases and the substantial reporting on the
mismanagement of these databases. The CalGang audit revealed that
thirteen percent of entries in the database lacked the required
evidence to support the entry and found other significant errors
throughout the database. 2 6 The audit also found that old gang entries
were not reviewed and deleted in accordance with the statutory
guidelines, more or less ensuring that once an individual was
designated as a gang member, the designation was for life.2 5: While
this is undoubtedly problematic for the thousands of noncitizens in
California's database, this audit is also problematic for the immigration
courts that admit this data because other state databases use similar

supra note 91, at 103, 123 (arguing that law enforcement discretion in
applying enforcement criteria generally allows for the perpetuation of racial
stereotypes, and explaining why the majority of people swept into the criminal justice
system are young men of color).
254. See GANG IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES REPORT, supra note 79, at 15 (recounting
the difficulties noncitizens accused of gang membership face in immigration
proceedings because they lack notice of the allegation).
255. See supra Section 1.B.1 (outlining statutory requirements for gang databases).
256. See CALGANGAUDIT, supranote 113, at 1, 3; StateAudit AffirmsACLUof California
Concerns on Gang Database, supra note 114 (asserting that the audit confirms that
CalGang database is rife with inaccurate entries and lacks critical oversight
mechanisms).
257. See Winston, Marked for Life, supra note 118 (describing the near impossibility
of removing an individual's name from CalGang and other concerns for individuals
listed in the database).
ALEXANDER,
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criteria and technology."'
This report raises significant concerns
about the trustworthiness, accuracy, and probative value of the data in
other gang databases regularly accessed by ICE. If management,
oversight, and technological errors were present in CalGang, it is likely
they are present in ICE's data because other states feeding the ICE
removal lists use the same commercially available software. 2 9 The
fundamentally unfair evidence standard requires the exclusion of gang
member designations pulled from these databases because the
designations are not probative of whether an individual merits
discretionary relief and the data carries the indicia of unreliability.
B. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge ProceduralDue Process Test to the
Admission of Gang Allegations in Immigration Court
The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process protections for all
"persons," bringing noncitizens present in the United States within the
ambit of its protections.260 In the context of a removal hearing, courts
have interpreted the Fifth Amendment to guarantee a noncitizen the
right to a full and fair hearing before an immigration judge, the right
to proffer evidence, and a reasonable opportunity to examine the
evidence against him. 2 1 Evidence admitted in immigration court must
be fundamentally fair, which means it must be probative, reliable, and
lawfully obtained.2 62 When determining what procedures satisfy due
process for noncitizens in removal proceedings, courts have applied
the Mathews test on a case-by-case basis. 26" The Mathews test requires
the court to weigh three competing interests: (1) the private interest
affected; (2) the government interest, including avoiding fiscal or
administrative burdens, in using the current procedures rather than
additional or proposed procedures; and (3) the risk of erroneous
deprivation to the individual under the current procedures and the

258. See Winston, supra note 21.
259. See id. (reporting that ICEGangs runs on the same commercially available
GangNet software as CalGang and other states).
260. See supra Section I.C.3 (outlining the Supreme Court's procedural due process
jurisprudence as it related to noncitizens).
261. See supra Sections I.C.1, 3 (stating the statutory requirements of immigration
proceedings and outlining the scope of due process for noncitizens in removal).
262. See supra Section 1.C.4 (defining the fundamental fairness evidentiary standard
in immigration proceedings).
263. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (announcing the test for
what procedural due process is required in civil cases).
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value of providing additional procedural safeguards. 264 When comparing
the procedures requested with the procedures in place, a reviewing
court assesses whether the procedures in place minimize the risk of
26
erroneous deprivation rather than what procedures would be best. a
Applying the Mathews test to the use of unsubstantiated gang data in
removal proceedings, the current procedures violate an individual
noncitizen's due process right to a full and fair hearing. An individual
has the highest private interest in meeting his burden of proof in
removal proceedings, but without notice it is very difficult to rebut a
gang allegation. The government interest in maintaining the current
immigration enforcement data-sharing agreements and immigration
court procedures is substantial, but providing a noncitizen with notice
of the gang allegations would create de minimis additional work.
Additionally, the risk of erroneous deprivation through removal is
minimized if the noncitizen receives the gang allegation in advance of
his immigration court hearings. Therefore, procedural due process
requires that DHS share this information with the noncitizen in
advance; otherwise, the data must be excluded.

1. Noncitizens seeking discretionaryrelief have a significantpersonal interest
in receiving notice of DHS's gang membership allegations against them
A noncitizen facing removal has the highest personal interest in
presenting strong evidence and examining the evidence against him
because of the severity of removal as a penalty and the obstacles to reentry after removal. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that an
individual facing removal from the United States has a "weighty"
personal interest in remaining in the United States.266 While individuals
have no protected property or liberty interest in the outcome of a
discretionary case,267 the Court has recognized their protected interest
268
in the opportunity to meaningfully apply for relief.
Noncitizens removed from the United States face differing bars to
re-entry dependent upon their grounds of removal, but the ability to

264. Id.
265. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 447-48 (2011) (holding that it is not
necessary to require that a defendant be provided counsel in every civil contempt
proceeding because there is "available a set of 'substitute procedural safeguards' that,
if employed, "can significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty"
(quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335)).
266. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
267. See, e.g., FongYue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 702 (1893).
268. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 307-08 (2001).
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return legally is extremely difficult and never guaranteed. 26 9 The
minimum bar to applying for admission after removal is five years, and
a noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony and deported will be
barred from applying for admission for twenty years.270 However, even
if a noncitizen can reapply, criminal bars to admission and the discretion
of immigration authorities may prevent him from re-entering. 271 If an
individual seeks to re-enter without authorization, he will face ten years
in prison for illegal re-entry after removal and twenty years for re-entry
after the commission of a felony.2 72 Realistically, once an individual is
removed, returning legally to the United States will not be an option.
An individual in removal proceedings has a great personal interest
in receiving notice of the discretionary case against him so that he can
make his application for discretionary relief as strong as possible. As
discussed above, a removal hearing for an individual seeking
discretionary relief has two components: (1) demonstrating eligibility
under the statute and (2) demonstrating that he merits a grant of
relief.
Acknowledging the important role notice plays in an
individual's case, the INA requires DHS to share an NTA with a
noncitizen in advance of removal hearings. However, a successful case
requires meeting his burden of proof and then establishing that he
merits a favorable exercise of discretion.273 Providing notice through
the NTA and the 1-213 would give the individual a reasonable
opportunity to examine the evidence against him, as provided in the
regulations,2 74 and make the hearing more fair because he would have
a more meaningful opportunity to meet the burden of proof in both
the statutory and discretionary portions of his case. 27' Relatedly,
individuals seeking bond also have a significant interest in reviewing
this information before they enter immigration court because gang
allegations affect whether they will be eligible for release or subject to

269. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A) (2012) (listing conditions for re-admission for
certain previously removed noncitizens).
270. §1182(a)(2)(A),(9)(A).
271. Id.
272. See § 1326 (imposing criminal penalties for the "reentry of removed aliens"
into the United States).
273. § 1229b; 8 C.F.R. §§ 240.11(d), 1240.8(d) (2017).
274. See8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) (4) (B).
275. See § 1229(a) (1)-(2) (A) (requiring written notice to be given to the individual
specifying the nature of the proceeding, the legal authority under which the
proceeding is conducted, the acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of the law, and
the charge or charges against the individual).
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immigration detention.276 The liberty interest in avoiding immigration

detention aside, noncitizens have a far greater chance of prevailing in
their application for relief if they are not detained.

77

However,

immigration judges presented with allegations of gang membership have
2 78
proven unwilling to grant bond when faced with these allegations.
Finally, even if the individual loses his case, he retains a high
personal interest in receiving notice that he may be deported as a
"gang member."
DHS has reported that it shares deportation
information about incoming "gang members" with law enforcement
agencies in Central America. 79 In 2015, The Guardian, a British news
publication, confirmed that since January 2014, eighty-three U.S.
deportees had been murdered upon their deportation to El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras. 28 0 Ironically, many Central American
migrants facing deportation as gang members arrived in the United
States fleeing gang violence but relocated to neighborhoods where
domestic chapters of the same gangs are active, increasing the
likelihood of law enforcement entering them into a gang database.8 1
Therefore, the personal interest in receiving notification of DHS's

gang membership allegation in advance
proceedings is extremely high.

of immigration court

276. See § 1226(a)-(b) (providing the requirements for a discretionary bond
determination); supra Section I.C.2 (discussing the important role of discretion in
immigration court, both in the removal proceeding and in bond determination).
277. See BLAZING A TRAIL: THE FIGHT FOR RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN DETENTION AND
BEYOND, NAT'L IMMIGR. L. CTR. 1, 4-5 (2016),
https://www.nilc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Right-to-Counsel-Blazing-a-Trail-2016-03.pdf
(reporting
the obstacles detained noncitizens face when trying to prepare their case, such as
difficulty obtaining counsel, restrictive detention conditions, lack of access to legal
materials or supporting documentation, ICE policies of frequently shifting detainees,
and distance from family and friends).
278. See Holper, supra note 135, at 689-90 (cautioning that gang membership
allegations will unfairly influence decisions to grant bond); GANG IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES REPORT, supra note 79, at 6 (recounting a client's erroneous classification
in the 1-213 as a gang member, which made him ineligible for bond and placed him
in an immigration detention facility with those who pose a greater threat to safety than
other detainees); Winston, Marked for Life, supra note 118 (reporting that DHS
attorneys often characterize gang members as threats to public safety, placing their I213s in color-coded folders to connote the risk and asking judges to withhold bond).
279. See Winston, Markedfor Life, supra note 118; see also Brodzinsky & Pilkington,
supra note 35.
280. See Brodzinsky & Pilkington, supra note 35 (citing eighty-three confirmed
deaths but noting the numbers are likely much higher).
281. See Winston, Markedfor Life, supra note 118.
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2. The government has a significant interest in combating transnational
criminalgangs and maintainingthe current immigration enforcement datasharingagreements
In immigration cases, the government interests are clear and
compelling: sovereignty and security. As noted in Plasencia, few
governmental concerns supersede federal control over immigration
"for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative. 2 2
The government also has a significant interest in protecting U.S.
communities from gangs that endanger the neighborhoods in which
they operate. 8 3
Combating violent gangs is a priority for law
enforcement across the United States, and many local and federal law
enforcement leaders count gang databases and data-sharing
agreements as vital tools in this fight. 2 4 The government has an
interest in maintaining families and preventing the break-up of
communities in the United States. Congressional intent to balance
these competing interests, which are often present in immigrant
communities, is visible throughout the immigration code. 2"s For
example, Congress created discretionary relief and waivers for some
immigrants convicted of certain crimes who can show either significant
equities or whose deportation would cause a U.S. citizen family
member "extreme hardship. '2 6 When considering whether to grant a
request for discretionary relief, the BIA has advised immigration
judges to balance factors that indicate strong community and familial
ties with negative factors that indicate "bad character or undesirability
as a permanent resident of this country. "287
In addition to the government interest in regulating which
noncitizens remain in U.S. communities, the government has a
humanitarian and national security interest in the geopolitical realities
of the countries to its south. The extreme violence in the Northern
282.

Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).

283. Liz Robins &Alan Feuer, 'They Keep FindingBodies': Gang Violence in Long Island
Town Fuels Immigration Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/10/03/nyregion/they-keep-finding-bodies-gang-violence-in-long-island-townfuels-immigration-debate.html (describing the devastating effects of MS-13 street gang
violence in one Long Island town).
284. Joseph, supra note 14.
285. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 41, at 269-70 (expounding that family
reunification is a cornerstone of U.S. immigration policy, with an estimated eighty
percent of all immigrant admissions to the United States being family members of U.S.
citizens and legal permanent residents).
286. See8 U.S.C. § 1182(v) (2012); C-V-T-, 221. &N. Dec. 7,11 (B.I.A.1998).
287. C-V-T-,221. & N. Dec. at 11.
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Triangle implicates not only security concerns for the United States,
but also humanitarian responsibilities. According to the international
humanitarian principle of non-refoulement, the U.S. government may
not remove an individual to a country where an individual's life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group."' The United States has codified elements of the Convention
against Torture and, under these laws, is prohibited from returning an
individual to a country where it is more likely than not that he would
be tortured. 8 9 If the individual meets his burden of proof, the grant
of relief is mandatory.2 9 While these are extremely difficult claims for
noncitizens to win, their existence in the immigration framework
demonstrates a governmental interest in ensuring that noncitizens are
removed in a manner that not only complies with due process but that
complies with humanitarian law.291
3. Providingnotice to noncitizens accused of gang membership would create
de minimis administrativeburdensforDHS and immigrationcourts
Providing a noncitizen requesting discretionary relief with notice of
a gang membership allegation would create little to no extra work for
the government. First, all of the information DHS plans to use against
an individual is listed in the 1-213, including information pulled
through Operation Community Shield and other data-sharing
agreements. 292 Because this document is prepared in every case,
providing one additional copy for the individual would create de
minimis additional work for the government. Currently, DHS is not
required to share the 1-213 document, but a regulation or an
immigration judge in an individual case could require it to do so.
Second, in many cases DHS does not need the gang membership
designation to deny bond or win removal because either the
individual's criminal record is substantial or the individual committed
288. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (3). For an interesting discussion on the patchwork of U.S.
refugee law and a suggestion for improvement, see Elizabeth Keyes, Unconventional
Refugees, 67 AM. U. L. REv. 89 (2017).
289. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17 (2017).
290. Id.
291. See In-County Refugee/Parole Processingfor Minors in Honduras, El Salvador and
Guatemala (Central American Minors - CAM), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/CAM (last updated Aug. 16, 2017) (describing the small
program launched by the USCIS in 2014 that allows certain qualified children from
the Northern Triangle and an accompanying parent to apply for refugee status).
292. See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.

2017]

FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR

an aggravated felony, which triggers mandatory detention, automatic
removal, and bars discretionary relief.29
Therefore, providing the
noncitizen with notice would not affect DHS's case against him, and it
would uphold a higher level of due process protection. However, if
DHS had concerns that sharing this data would hamstring an
important enforcement tool or if there was resistance to sharing this
information for policy reasons, DHS could be required to share this
information only if the noncitizen is not barred from and is requesting
discretionary relief. In these limited cases, DHS could be required to
share the 1-213 or any other document populated from databases in
advance of the hearing. In some of these cases, an individual faced
with the evidence against him might choose not to contest the
allegation, which would promote efficiency by removing the case from
the immigration court docket completely. Equal notice for all
noncitizens facing removal would be much easier to administrate than
a case-by-case assessment, but the case-by-case assessment for a smaller,
discrete set of cases would not put undue burden on DHS for the
reasons discussed above. Additionally, where DHS has case-specific
national security concerns, the INA allows DHS to withhold its
evidence against the individual.294 Therefore, considering the severity
of deportation's consequences, the potential and slight burden on
DHS does not outweigh the individual's interest in having an
opportunity to prepare his case and refute the allegation.2 9

4. Admitting unsubstantiatedgang data in removalproceedings increases
the risk of erroneous deprivation of a noncitizen's interest in living in the
United States
In cases where both the personal interest and governmental interest
are high, courts apply the Mathews test to determine which procedures

293. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2) (A)-(B) (listing criminal bars to asylum); § 1226(c)
(requiring mandatory detention for certain aliens that are inadmissible or deportable
due to alleged criminal activity); § 1227(a) (2) (A) (listing criminal grounds for
deportation, including any noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony at any time);
§ 1229b(a) (listing criminal bars to cancellation of removal); see also Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) (commenting that under current law, removal
from the country is a nearly "automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen
offenders").
294. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(4).
295. See Padilla,559 U.S. at 365-66 (remarking upon the severity of deportation as
a civil penalty).
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are most likely to minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation. 296 For
individuals facing removal and accused of gang membership, the
current due process procedures do not minimize this risk and can even
compound it in some cases. The chronic and systemic errors within
gang databases call into question whether this information meets the
"trustworthiness" threshold required by the BIA.297 Not only does local
law enforcement collect information for purposes unrelated to
immigration law and removability, but the information itself is often
unsubstantiated, wrong, or mismanaged.2 98 Once data is shared with
DHS through Operation Community Shield, DHS is not required to
corroborate entries before submitting them to the immigration
court. 299 Under the current system, therefore, an erroneous entry
could flow unimpeded from a state database to the immigration judge,
significantly decreasing the likelihood of reaching the correct result in
a removal hearing.
Additionally, the current due process procedures do not minimize
the risk of erroneous deprivation because immigrants facing
deportation as gang members are easily misunderstood and
misrepresented by government trial attorneys. 00 In Goldberg, the Court
recognized that government social workers made poor representatives
for groups with limited access to the government and negative societal
stereotypes, and these groups should have the opportunity to examine
the case against them?0 1 Similarly, database entries are created by

296. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (outlining the factors of the
balancing test).
297. See supra Section I.C.4 (presenting the case law behind the fundamental
fairness standard).
298. See CALGANGAUDIT, supra note 113, at 1, 2 (recommending that the California
legislature pass legislation to review and redraft the CalGang oversight and
management infrastructure because an audit revealed significant error and
mismanagement); State Audit Affirns A CLUof CaliforniaConcerns on GangDatabase,supra
note 114 (providing examples of numerous erroneous entries revealed in the audit).
299. See supra Section I.B.2 (discussing the close working relationship between state
law enforcement agencies and federal immigration officials in their anti-gang
collaborate efforts and how any errors or issues at the state level are transmitted
directly to ICE without oversight or corroboration).
300. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (declaring that a welfare
recipient must be allowed to state his position orally in order for the due process
procedure to be satisfactory); Hufstader, supra note 16, at 690-91 (analogizing the
caseworkers tasked with representing citizen welfare recipients to students seeking
DACA while being represented as gang members due to database entries).
301. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266 (pronouncing that welfare recipients must be fully
informed of the case against them in advance because "the possibility for honest error
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police officers tasked specifically with identifying and observing gang
members.
This data is not gathered for immigration purposes;
therefore, important countervailing information or additional context
significant to the discretionary relief analysis is not recorded.0 2 This
data is then shared with DHS, an agency tasked with prioritizing the
deportation of "known gang members or other individuals who pose a
°
clear danger to public safety. 303
Without further corroboration by
DHS or the noncitizen, however, an immigration judge presented with
this information will not know if the conduct that led to a "gang
member" designation was dangerous or innocuous,3 0 4 increasing the
risk of erroneous deprivation.
Conversely, the likelihood of
reaching the correct result is significantly increased if DHS shares the
allegation in advance and the individual has the opportunity to provide
mitigating evidence or context for gang allegations specifically.
Finally, a noncitizen facing removal should be fully informed of the
discretionary case against him because removal effectively bars an
individual's ability to seek redress. Appeals following a denial of
discretionary relief are limited, and appellate courts give immigration
judges great deference in their decisions.3 0 6 Additionally, appealing a
decision in immigration court does not stay an individual's removal
from the country. 7 If a noncitizen exhausts his appeals or is removed
before his appeal is granted, he faces almost insurmountable barriers
to availing himself of administrative appeals from outside the country.
For example, maintaining or obtaining counsel or gathering evidence

or irritable misjudgment too great, to allow termination of aid without giving the
recipient a chance, if he so desires, to be fully informed of the case against him").
302. See Hufstader, supra note 16, at 691 (noting that when an officer is tasked with
recording information justifying why someone is a gang member, he has no reason to
note any countervailing information he observes).
303. ProsecutorialDiscretionMemo 2011, supra note 12.
304. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (listing examples of state gang
database statutes).
305. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text (noting that because
immigration judges find it difficult to look beyond gang allegations, the risk of
erroneous deprivation is heightened if unsubstantiated police reports and other
similar data are not corroborated).
306. See Holper, supra note 135, at 677-79 (noting that reviewing courts apply
stricter scrutiny when an immigration judge relies on a police report to establish
removability but the immigration judge will receive wide latitude to use the same
police report to reach a negative discretionary decision).
307. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (3) (B) (2012) ("Service of the petition on the officer or
employee does not stay the removal of an alien pending the court's decision on the
petition, unless the court orders otherwise.").
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will be extremely difficult. Accordingly, the government's interest in
reaching the correct result and the individual's interest in making his
strongest application for discretionary relief are both better served if
the noncitizen receives notice of DHS's discretionary case against him.
If DHS uses uncorroborated gang data against an individual in
immigration court, the fundamental fairness evidentiary standard and
the Mathews test require DHS to share the information with the
individual in advance, thereby offering him a meaningful opportunity
to meet his burden of proof and examine the evidence against him in
a full and fair hearing.
III.

SOLUTIONS TO THE FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND DUE PROCESS
ISSUES RAISED BYADMITING UNCOROBOATED GANG MEMBERSHIP
ALLEGATIONS IN IMMIGRATION COURT PROCEEDINGS

A. ProvideNoncitizens with Notice of Their Gang Member Designation in
Advance of Their Hearing
Providing a noncitizen with notice of the statutory and
discretionary case against him, by sharing the 1-213 in conjunction with
an NTA, would satisfy the Mathews test's procedural due process
requirements. While sharing the 1-213 does not fix the fundamentally
unfair nature of this data because the 1-213 pulls directly from state
and local databases with no additional corroboration,0 8 notice would
allow a noncitizen to examine this evidence against him and prepare
rebuttal evidence, making the hearing fairer.0 9 Providing reasonable
notice to noncitizens accused of gang membership will also make it
easier for immigration judges to fully exercise the discretion Congress
has afforded them in bond determinations and grants of discretionary
relief. Notice also increases due process protections for the noncitizen
while creating de minimis additional work for DHS. First, an NTA is
already prepared by DHS and shared with all individuals in advance of
the hearing. Second, section 239 of the INA requires that an NTA
include "acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law. '3 1 0 This
language should be read to require DHS to list in an NTA conduct that
violates executive orders or enforcement priorities, such as suspected
gang membership. Because the 1-213 is generally prepared before an

308. See supra Section I.C (discussing the use of 1-213s in removal proceedings and
the difficulty of contesting the 1-213).
309. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (c) (4).
310. § 1229(a)(1) (C).

2017]

FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR

NTA and DHS is required to locate the individual and make proper
service of an NTA, serving the 1-213 in conjunction with the NTA would
not impose an additional burden on DHS. However, an individual's
receipt of this information and an opportunity to prepare a rebuttal in
advance of a removal hearing could be the difference between
detention and bond, removal and relief.
Additionally, resolving the issue of notice through regulations or
administration procedures acknowledges the immigration as a divisive,
contentious issue. The current political climate is hostile towards
increasing protections for immigrants in general, especially those with
criminal records or accused of criminal activity. 11 With these realities
in mind, the practical solution is to address due process concerns at
the level of individual immigration judges or immigration court
practices and procedures. Providing notice in this manner protects an
individual's right to a fair hearing and fundamentally fair evidence
without adding significant additional burden to DHS or depriving
DHS of an important enforcement tool.

B. Require DHS to CorroborateGangDatabseInformation Before It is
Admitted in Immigration Proceedings
Regulations, the BIA, or immigration court procedures could
require DHS to corroborate gang database information as a condition
of its inclusion in the 1-213. Further corroboration by DHS would
address the reliability issues currently presented by this data and allow
an immigration judge to determine the underlying conduct and the
recency of the conduct that led to the designation, relevant factors in
the discretionary analysis. 12
Following the Supreme Court's
characterization of removal proceedings as often "intimately
related" ' to the criminal process, criminal law procedures and
requirements for corroborating less reliable sources of evidence could
be incorporated into immigration hearings using gang database
information. What specific corroboration procedures to model from
criminal law is beyond the scope of this Comment, but precedent for
incorporating some criminal law protections or procedures into civil
proceedings can be found in other "quasi-criminal" proceedings such

311. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
312. See supra Section II.A (arguing that unsubstantiated gang database entries
constitute fundamentally unfair evidence because entries alone do not describe the
underlying conduct that led to the designation).
313. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 365, 365-66 (2010).
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as juvenile delinquency proceedings, parental termination
proceedings, civil commitment proceedings, and court martial
proceedings. 14 Immigration proceedings with discretionary components,
such as a bond or removal hearing, and especially those stemming
from criminal convictions, arguably belong on the list above. 1 '
Corroboration would take significant steps to address the factors that
make unsubstantiated gang database entries fundamentally unfair:
reliability and probative value." 6 Accepting the results of the CalGang
audit and other evidence that gang databases often contain errors or
outdated information, 7 the data is unreliable on its face. Requiring
DHS to conduct additional investigation, such as contacting the locality
in which the database operates, researching the gang membership
criteria in a specific jurisdiction, or speaking with the police officer
who created the entry are all examples of important contextual information
that could either bolster the validity of an entry or identify an error.
Corroboration would also increase the probative value of any
proffered gang allegation. As discussed previously, under many state
statutes, the conduct underlying a "gang member" designation can be
innocuous, such as seen wearing gang dress, or nefarious, such as
furthering a gang's criminal activities.3 1 '

Through discussions with

local police or legal research into the criteria of a specific criminal
statute, the recency and conduct underlying the designation could be
uncovered. If DHS could not determine what conduct led to the
designation, that would be probative context for the immigration
judge as he or she weighed an individual's discretionary application.
If DHS could determine the underlying conduct and the recency of
the conduct, that is equally probative context for the immigration
judge to weigh when considering whether the noncitizen is a danger
to his community or has demonstrated proof of genuine rehabilitation
and good moral character.3 1 9 Furthermore, DHS is best situated to

provide this context because the majority of states do not require law
enforcement to notify individuals that they have been designated a

314.

See Markowitz, supra note 206, at 1351.

315. See generally Holper, supra note 135; Markowitz, supra note 206.
316. Pouhova v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1007, 1011, 1013 (7th Cir. 2013).
317. See supra Section I.B.2 (identifying reliability issues within CalGang specifically
and federal data-sharing agreements in general).
318. See supra Section II.A. (arguing that the broad range of conduct covered by
most state gang statutes removes the probative value of a "gang member" designation).
319. C-V-T-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998).
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gang member, and many individuals before immigration court may be
unaware of their gang member designation. 20
While further corroboration by local and state police would likely
make the gang database entries more reliable, this approach does not
address the due process concerns raised by the admissibility of police
statements or reports in immigration courts.
To address the
confrontation and reliability issues presented by police reports in
immigration court, one scholar has argued that immigration judges
should not admit police reports into evidence unless the police officers
are available for and subject to cross-examination. 21
C. State Solutions: CaliforniaAssembly Bill No. 2298
If DHS does not corroborate gang database information at the
federal level, legislation at the state level could revise data entry
procedures to reduce inaccuracies and require that law enforcement
provide notice to individuals listed in gang databases. Recent events
in California provide an interesting example and potential model for
other jurisdictions concerned about the accuracy of the data in gang
databases and the disproportionate effects of gang databases on
minority and immigrant communities.
The 2016 audit of CalGang revealed significant and systemic flaws in
the entries, prompting the California Assembly to introduce Assembly
Bill No. 2298.22 The bill modified California Penal Code Sections
186.34 and 186.35 relating to criminal gangs, and requires that all
individuals listed as suspected gang members, associates, or affiliates in
CalGang or other "shared gang databases" are provided written notice
and an opportunity to contest the designation. 2 This modification
followed the 2013 California statute requiring law enforcement to
notify a parent or guardian before entering a minor into any "shared
gang database.3 24 In September 2017 the California legislature went
320. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
321. See Holper, supra note 135, at 677 (assessing the evidentiary issues presented
by police reports in immigration court and arguing for the right for noncitizens to
confront the police officers in removal proceedings).
322. Jazmine Ulloa, California Justice Department Would Oversee All Shared Gang
DatabasesAcross the State UnderBill Sent to Governor, L.A. TIMES (Sept.14, 2017, 5:13 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updatescalifornia-justice-department-would-1505432901-htmlstory.htm
(reporting that the
audit revealed CalGang recorded disproportionate numbers of black and Latino youth
so error-ridden as to be ineffective to police).
323. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.34, 186.35 (West 2017).
324. Id.
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one step further, placing CalGang under the oversight of the
California Department of Justice. 2 ' After the California Assembly
passed the bill 41-29,26 Governor Jerry Brown signed the bill into law
on October 12, 2017.27 With the bill now enacted into the law,
beginning in January 2017 the Department will promulgate new entry
criteria and data maintenance rules, as well as greater restrictions on
sharing CalGang with different law enforcement officials, including
federal immigration officials. 28
Similar legislation could be passed in other states participating in
Operation Community Shield or where existing data-sharing
agreements with DHS are in place.
CONCLUSION

It is a tenuous time for noncitizens-of all statuses-living in the
United States. Encouraged by a zealous Executive and a supportive
Congress, immigration enforcement officials are using their expanded
authority to place greater numbers of noncitizens in detention and
removal, and the enforcement ramp-up shows no signs of slowing in
the months and years to come. While some more sympathetic groups
of immigrants may receive reprieve from removal, the specter of the
crimmigrant gang member remains a salient political talking point and
policy justification. As DHS increases its reliance on state and local
gang databases to define federal immigration targets, the likelihood
that innocent-but mislabeled-noncitizens will be placed in removal
proceedings also increases. Without notice of their designation as a
crimmigrant gang member, noncitizens will not receive their Fifth
Amendment right to a full and fair hearing because they will not be
able to examine the evidence against them or gather the evidence they
need to rebut these allegations and support their application for relief.

325.

See Ulloa, supra note 322.

326.

Assemb. B. 90, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
Governor Brown Issues Legislative Update, OFF. OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN

327.

JR. (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id 20015 (announcing that
Governor Gerry Brown signed A.B. 90 into law on October 12, 2017).
328. Cal. Assemb. A.B. 90 (noting specifically section 7(k) (8), which states that
"[t]he department, with the advice of the committee, shall promulgate regulations
governing the use, operation, and oversight of shared gang databases. The regulations
issued by the department shall, at minimum, ensure the following ....
Any records
contained in a shared gang database are not disclosed for purposes of enforcing
federal immigration law, unless required by state or federal statute or regulation.").
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There are procedural steps, however, that could be implemented in
removal proceedings to make the proceeding more fundamentally
fair. At minimum, DHS could be required to share gang allegations
with the noncitizen when the NTA is shared. This would provide the
noncitizen with a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence
against him and prepare any rebuttal evidence or witness testimony he
wishes to proffer. This solution, while administratively feasible, does
not address the underlying reliability issues presented by gang
database entries. Requiring DHS to corroborate gang database entries
before they are admitted to immigration court would increase the
reliability and probative value of the information, aiding immigration
judges in the discretionary analysis. Finally, states can enact legislation
that makes the gang databases themselves more reliable and fair, by
ensuring data is maintained, revising gang designation criteria, and
providing individuals with notice of their designation.

